Quality Rare Earth Metals & Rare Earth Oxides factory

Take neodymium iron boron magnets as an example. This material, known as the "King of Permanent Magnets", is a core component of the drive motors in new energy vehicles, wind turbines, and industrial robots. A high-end new energy vehicle's drive motor requires 1-2 kilograms of neodymium iron boron magnets. Among them, only 1% of the dysprosium and terbium elements are the key to the magnet's high-temperature resistance (up to over 200°C) and demagnetization resistance - they act like "magnetic stabilizers", ensuring that the motor maintains high efficiency even under high-load operation. China not only monopolizes 93% of the global heavy rare earth refining capacity but also, through its independently developed ion-type rare earth ore purification technology, has raised the extraction purity of dysprosium and terbium to 99.99%, forming a "full-chain barrier" from mining to purification.   Another underestimated "strategic metal" is antimony. Antimony-lead alloys containing 6% to 8% antimony have three times the hardness of pure lead and a 40% increase in impact resistance. They are core materials for bullet cores and artillery shell casings - the addition of antimony to a regular bullet core can penetrate steel plates 1.5 times thicker; adding antimony to missile casings can better withstand high-temperature friction and fragment impacts during high-speed flight. China not only has 14% to 30% of the world's antimony reserves (over 300,000 tons) but also, with an annual output of over 30,000 tons (40% of the global total), is the only country in the world that can stably supply high-purity antimony-lead alloys, providing a "hard support" for the upgrading of national defense equipment.

New Energy Sector: From Electric Vehicles to Energy Storage, Rare Earths Become the "Efficiency Driver" ​​ The global penetration rate of new energy vehicles has exceeded 20%, and solid-state batteries with high energy density and fast charging performance are moving from the laboratory to mass production. Meanwhile, rare earth permanent magnet synchronous motors remain the "optimal solution" for efficient power transmission - high-performance versions of Tesla Model 3 and high-end models of BYD's "Han" series all list rare earth magnetic materials as standard for their motors, as they can increase motor efficiency to over 97% (compared to 85%-90% for traditional motors). Additionally, the annual growth rate of wind power installations exceeds 10%, and the "heart" of wind turbines, the rotor, also relies on rare earth permanent magnet materials. In the energy storage field, solid-state batteries doped with rare earths are accelerating research and development, with energy density 30% higher than traditional lithium batteries, and are expected to become the "ceiling" of next-generation energy storage.  Military Sector: From Ammunition to Precision Equipment, Rare Earths Become the "Performance Lever" ​​ In modern warfare, the "accuracy" and "protection" of weapons and equipment directly determine the outcome. Antimony-based alloys are not only used in bullets and artillery shells but also in tank armor - composite armor containing 3%-5% antimony can increase anti-penetration capability by 25%, making it the "standard protection" for main battle tanks. Rare earth elements lanthanum and cerium are used in radar components and precision optical instruments: lanthanum series elements can enhance the anti-interference ability of radars, extending the detection range of fighter aircraft radars by 20%; cerium-based materials can increase the light transmission rate of optical lenses, maintaining clear imaging even at night or in bad weather. With the global geopolitical situation becoming tense, defense budgets of various countries are tilting towards equipment upgrades (such as the US 2025 National Defense Authorization Act adding a $5 billion equipment modernization fund), and the "military attributes" of rare earths have been fully activated.

It has been reported that rare earth exploration and development company Pensana has abandoned plans to build a rare earth oxide separation facility at Saltend near Hull in the Humber Freeport. The project, which was set to cost £250 million, was originally expected to provide 450 jobs during construction and 150 during operation. Its aim was to establish an independent and sustainable rare earth supply chain and process in the midstream to produce magnetic metals in the UK for use in products such as electric vehicles and wind turbines. The factory was to process neodymium and praseodymium from a mine in Longonjo, Angola. Sky News today (October 16) quoted Pensana's chairman Paul Atherley as saying that the company decided to withdraw from Saltend after the US government promised to buy rare earth elements from the Mountain Pass mine in the US at guaranteed prices, while no European government had done so. Atherley said: "This has re-priced the market - Washington wants to do more of these deals and is doing it at an incredible pace." "Europe and the UK have been talking about critical minerals for a long time. But when the Americans do it, they do it with gusto and really follow through. We don't; we mostly just talk about it." He warned that the rare earth processing process is complex, energy-intensive and expensive, and is currently not feasible in the UK. The Saltend plant was set to receive millions of pounds in UK government funding and was supposed to be a key part of the UK's critical minerals strategy. Currently, China produces approximately 90% of all finished rare earth metals - these elements are crucial for the production of many technologies, energy and military-related products. Pensana was seen as the UK's response to concerns over the availability of rare earth supplies. The government chose the Saltend Chemicals Park in 2022 to launch its critical minerals strategy.

When the manufacturing process enters the sub-7-nanometer range, the thickness of the gate dielectric layer of transistors is less than 5 nanometers - equivalent to 30 atoms lined up side by side. At this point, the traditional silicon dioxide (SiO₂) dielectric will leak due to the "tunneling effect", wasting power like a "leaky battery". The addition of rare earth elements has enabled semiconductors to break through this physical limit. The high-k dielectric process is the core of the solution. Currently, the mainstream high-k material is hafnium oxide (HfO₂), but the dielectric constant (k value) of pure HfO₂ is about 25, which is still insufficient to support the 3-nanometer process. Therefore, two rare earth elements, lanthanum (La) and yttrium (Y), have been "invited" into the dielectric layer: a few angstroms thick layer of lanthanum oxide (La₂O₃) is deposited on the surface of HfO₂. After high-temperature annealing, lanthanum ions will diffuse to the interface between the dielectric and silicon, forming "interface dipoles", which is like installing a "voltage regulator" for the transistor, reducing the threshold voltage by more than 0.2V. This means that under the same performance, the power consumption of the chip can be reduced by 30%; under the same power consumption, the switching speed can be increased by 20%. This "rare earth empowerment" is also extending to more cutting-edge fields. The thulium (Tm) laser developed by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in the United States uses thulium ions to generate 2μm lasers, which is expected to increase the efficiency of EUV light sources from the current 0.02% to 0.2% - this means that the power consumption of lithography machines can be reduced by 90%, and the cost can be halved. In the 5G RF field, aluminum scandium nitride (AlScN) films, due to the addition of scandium (Sc), have a piezoelectric performance three times that of pure aluminum nitride (AlN), making them the "performance king" of BAW filters and directly determining whether mobile phones can achieve high-speed communication in the 5G high-frequency band.

If rare earth magnets are the "muscles" of semiconductor equipment, then rare earth compounds are the "scalpels" in the processing stage. In the "transformation" of a wafer from a crude silicon wafer to a chip, every step of "carving" relies on the "precise operation" of rare earths. Chemical mechanical polishing (CMP) is the most typical example. When the surface of a wafer needs to achieve atomic-level flatness, traditional abrasives (such as silicon dioxide) rely on "brute force grinding", which is prone to scratching the wafer; while cerium dioxide (CeO₂) polishing agents use the dual effect of "chemical reaction + physical grinding", like an "intelligent eraser" to precisely remove impurities. In an alkaline environment, cerium ions (Ce³⁺/Ce⁴⁺) on the surface of CeO₂ react with silicon dioxide (SiO₂) to form soluble cerium silicate, achieving "selective removal" - the removal rate of SiO₂ is three times that of traditional abrasives, yet it hardly damages surrounding materials such as silicon nitride. Currently, over 90% of shallow trench isolation (STI) polishing processes worldwide use CeO₂ polishing agents, and a single 12-inch wafer polishing process requires the consumption of about 10 grams of high-purity CeO₂ (99.99% purity).   The "protective shield" of etching machines also relies on rare earths. During the etching process, fluorine plasma is as corrosive as "aqua regia", and ordinary quartz components will be eroded with holes in no time. However, a yttrium oxide (Y₂O₃) coating can form a "chemical barrier" on the surface of the component: yttrium (Y) oxide has extremely strong chemical stability and will form a dense yttrium fluoride (YF₃) protective layer in fluorine plasma, extending the component's lifespan from 3 months to over 1 year. The inner lining of advanced process etching machines from TSMC and Samsung is almost entirely coated with Y₂O₃ - this "rare earth anti-corrosion" approach currently has no alternative.   Even the inspection stage cannot do without rare earths. The core material of the laser used for wafer alignment is neodymium-doped yttrium aluminum garnet (Nd:YAG) crystal. Neodymium ions (Nd³⁺) can generate 1.064μm laser, which is converted into 355nm ultraviolet light to achieve nanometer-level alignment inspection. Without this laser, the wafer cannot be precisely "aligned" with the mask, and the chip yield would plummet by more than 90%.

The "crown jewel" of semiconductor equipment, the lithography machine, is often hailed as the "pearl on the crown of human industry." However, few people know that its "pearl" status is entirely supported by rare earth magnets. EUV lithography machines require the wafer stage to move at several meters per second while maintaining sub-nanometer positioning accuracy. This "high-speed yet rock-solid" movement is made possible by the "violent output" of rare earth permanent magnets.   Neodymium iron boron (NdFeB) magnets are the core players. This alloy composed of neodymium (Nd), iron, and boron has a magnetic energy product more than ten times that of traditional magnets, earning it the title of "King of Permanent Magnets." However, neodymium alone is not enough: when the lithography machine is in operation, the motor temperature can exceed 100°C, and ordinary NdFeB magnets will "demagnetize and stop working" at this temperature. At this point, two rare earth elements, dysprosium (Dy) and terbium (Tb), come into play. They act like "high-temperature stabilizers," raising the Curie temperature (the demagnetization critical point) of the magnet from 312°C to over 400°C. Data shows that a single EUV lithography machine requires tens of kilograms of NdFeB magnetic steel, with neodymium accounting for about 30%, and dysprosium and terbium each making up 1% to 3%. These "trace elements" directly determine whether the lithography machine can scan wafers at a speed of 125 per hour while keeping the positioning error less than 0.3 nanometers (equivalent to an error of 1 centimeter in the diameter of the Earth).   More crucially, this reliance is almost irreplaceable. Currently, China accounts for over 90% of the global production capacity of the most advanced rare earth permanent magnets, and China holds 73% and 40% of the global reserves of dysprosium and terbium, respectively. Without rare earth magnets, the wafer stage of the lithography machine would become a "Parkinson's patient," and it would be impossible to stably mass-produce even 28-nanometer processes, let alone 3-nanometer ones.

The value of rare earths to the semiconductor industry is essentially "trace but decisive" - their usage often accounts for less than 0.1% of the total, yet they determine the "ceiling" of the entire industrial chain. This characteristic has trapped the semiconductor industry in a paradox of "the more advanced, the more dependent": On one hand, the more advanced the manufacturing process, the higher the purity and variety of rare earths required. For a 3-nanometer process, the purity of neodymium-iron-boron magnets needs to reach 99.999% (5N grade), while for a 28-nanometer process, 99.9% (3N grade) is sufficient; the isotopic abundance requirements for dysprosium and terbium have risen from "any proportion" to "a single isotope accounting for 99%". On the other hand, the "irreplaceability" of rare earths cannot be broken in the short term. In the field of permanent magnets, no other material can match the magnetic energy product of neodymium-iron-boron; in the field of polishing agents, the chemical selectivity of CeO₂ is ten times that of silicon dioxide; in high-k dielectrics, the interface dipole effect of lanthanum has no alternative element. The US Department of Energy has invested 1 billion dollars in searching for rare earth substitutes but has yet to make a breakthrough in the semiconductor field. This dependence is reshaping the global industrial landscape. Japan is sparing no expense to stockpile dysprosium and terbium, with its strategic reserves of rare earths set to increase to 90 days by 2024; the United States has passed the CHIPS and Science Act, requiring domestic mass production of rare earth permanent magnets by 2030; and China not only controls 60% of the world's rare earth reserves but also holds over 90% of the separation and purification technologies (with purity above 5N). This competition over "industrial vitamins" is essentially a struggle for "voice" in the semiconductor industry - whoever controls rare earths will hold the "pause button" in the next-generation 3-nanometer and 2-nanometer process races. Rare earths are not a "multiple-choice question", but a "compulsory question" From the nanoscale dance of lithography machines to the atomic-level optimization of transistors, rare earths support every breakthrough in the semiconductor industry as an "invisible force". It tells us a harsh truth: the "ocean of stars" of human technology often depends on a "handful of soil" deep within the earth. When we talk about chip autonomy, don't just focus on lithography machines - more fundamental than equipment is the control of rare earths, this "strategic cornerstone". Rare earths are not the "supporting actors" of the semiconductor industry, but the "vital point". In the future, with the development of quantum computing, AI chips, and other cutting-edge fields, the demand for rare earths will grow exponentially. This "power struggle in the microscopic world" has only just begun. And for every ordinary person, every smooth swipe on your phone may be underpinned by a "flavor enhancer" from a rare earth mine - silent and unobtrusive, yet determining the future of technology.

On October 9th, the Ministry of Commerce of China issued two announcements on strengthening the export control of rare earth-related items. The new regulations will impose export control on certain rare earth-related items and technologies that contain Chinese components from abroad. This further improves the rules and measures for the export control of relevant rare earth items and technologies under control in China, and has drawn attention from both domestic and international public opinion. The new regulations will help China better safeguard its national security and interests, and also demonstrate China's consistent stance of firmly maintaining world peace and regional stability and actively participating in international non-proliferation efforts.   This decision is by no means an impulsive one, but rather a part of China's systematic efforts to regulate the rare earth industry. The technology related to rare earths was included in the "Catalogue of Technologies Prohibited or Restricted from Exporting" as early as 2001. In April this year, the Chinese government also implemented export control over rare earth items exported by Chinese organizations and individuals. This announcement is a further improvement and strengthening of the existing management system, which not only demonstrates the continuity and stability of the national export control system, but also represents an enhancement of China's governance capacity in the rare earth sector. It is a routine measure for China to manage the rare earth industry in accordance with the law. Some foreign media are worried that normal rare earth trade may face a situation where "no goods can be imported" or even "stockouts". This is completely unnecessary. Rare earth-related items have dual-use properties for both military and civilian purposes. Implementing export control over them is a common international practice. Preventing rare earths from being used in activities that undermine international peace and security is an international non-proliferation obligation that all countries must undertake. On September 9th, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Commerce disclosed that in recent times, some foreign organizations and individuals have directly or after processing, transferred or provided rare earth control items originally from China to relevant organizations and individuals, directly or indirectly for use in sensitive areas such as the military. In the face of such behavior that causes significant damage or potential threats to China's national security and interests and has adverse effects on international peace and stability, China, as a responsible major country, must take action. This further confirms the necessity of China's regulation of rare earth-related technology exports. China's rare earth control is a natural extension of its modern governance system in the industrial field. In the 1990s, the disorderly development of China's rare earth industry due to extensive management not only depleted its resource endowment but also caused significant environmental damage. Such development is unsustainable and will ultimately affect the stability of the global supply chain. Actively aligning with international common practices, regulating and enhancing the governance level of the rare earth industry is not only a demand of China's own industrial development but also an inevitable step for China, as an important supplier of global key minerals, to fulfill its responsibilities as a major country. China accounts for 37% of the global rare earth reserves and produces over 60% of the global rare earth output. As a major supplier of rare earths, China has never used its resource advantage as a tool for hegemony. China's control over rare earths has always aimed at "regulating exports" rather than "prohibiting exports". Instead, the relevant control policies have always maintained openness and non-discrimination, neither setting barriers against specific countries nor leaving sufficient space for compliant trade. Since the implementation of China's rare earth control policies, not only has the global rare earth supply chain breakdown that some Western media claimed did not occur, but it has also promoted the industry's transformation from low-price, disorderly competition to high-quality development. This new regulation has also specifically reserved policy space for technologies that have entered the public domain, are necessary for basic scientific research, and are required for ordinary patents. All of these fully demonstrate the responsible attitude of the Chinese government in considering the actual needs of market entities. The so-called "China is choking the world's neck" speculation by some Western media is groundless and based on stereotyping others. It ignores the long-term standardized path and peaceful nature of China's rare earth control, and also misunderstands the deep value of its control over the global industrial chain. Building an open world economy is a consistent proposition of China. As long as it complies with the rules of the World Trade Organization, for China, resource and technology control will never become a form of resource and technology blockade. In the series of rare earth control regulations and policies that China has already introduced, we can see various green channels and exemption procedures, as well as a classified management model of "one case, one trial, one matter, one discussion". Behind these precise measures, as the spokesperson of the Ministry of Commerce said, it is to ensure the security and stability of the global industrial and supply chain. From these rare earth control policies of China, the international community can clearly see the development philosophy that China adheres to, that is, mutual interdependence among countries and shared destiny of the world. Globally, the management of rare earth technology will surely move towards a more standardized and transparent direction. China is playing a constructive role in this process and, through candid dialogue and cooperation, is jointly promoting the establishment of a fairer and more reasonable international rare earth trade order with the international community, and safeguarding the stability and prosperity of the global strategic resource supply chain.

In August, the EU's imports of magnets from China increased by 21%, while imports from the United States decreased by 5%. This highlights the growing dependence of Europe on Chinese magnets. New Western magnet factories are being built in the United States, Canada, and Europe, but experts warn that it may take several years to weaken China's dominant position. The resource security of rare earth magnets is a problem that the world is desperately trying to solve. This is mainly due to the increasing importance of rare earths in electronics, defense, automobiles, and other fields. Over the years, countries have been seeking ways to ensure access to these important resources. However, currently, 90% of the oil supply is in China's hands, and the relationship between China and the United States and other countries has recently not been ideal. Despite the best efforts, many countries' demand for rare earths still relies on Beijing. Now, this situation may be beginning to change. Rare earth magnets are more important than ever before. Today, almost every advanced country desires rare earth magnets because they can provide extremely powerful magnetic force in compact sizes, enabling the production of efficient motors and miniaturized components. This allows them to power basic systems in electric vehicles, wind turbines, smartphones, medical equipment, and defense equipment. Magnets have unique properties, such as heat resistance, which makes them even more important in applications where performance and precision are crucial. Therefore, as the global industry shifts towards electrification and automation, rare earth magnets have become a strategic asset, and supply chain control is increasingly regarded as a national security issue. China has once again controlled approximately 80% of the production of rare earth magnets. In total, the country produces over 200,000 tons of magnets annually, accounting for the vast majority of global supply. In contrast, the total production in North America and Europe is less than 2,000 tons, while Japan and Vietnam produce about 25,000 tons. Until about six months ago, the situation of these magnets being supplied from China to the rest of the world was still good. Subsequently, Beijing decided to stop exporting electric vehicles to some major trading partners, including the United States and the EU, which was clearly a warning against the US imposing tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles. Since then, China has allowed limited exports, but still maintains stricter controls to strengthen its geopolitical influence. Now, the latest data shows that the EU's purchases of rare earth magnets increased in August, while imports from the United States decreased. According to Bloomberg, this indicates concerns about resource security, as European countries are facing the most severe pressure from a global shortage of magnet supply. At the same time, analysts warn that the intensification of trade tensions may further endanger the acquisition of these key materials, potentially undermining Europe's green technology goals and weakening its industrial competitiveness. Overall, China's exports to the European Union increased by 21% in August, reaching 2,582 tons. Meanwhile, the shipment volume to the United States decreased by 5% month-on-month, dropping to around 590 tons. The data shows that so far this year, the amount of magnets imported by the EU from China is three times that of the United States. Experts say this highlights the greater changes in the global supply pattern. At present, China's dominant position in the rare earth magnet sector is expected to continue. According to The New York Times, the United States is trying to catch up with this Eastern country. However, despite these new efforts, the vast majority of the magnet supply in the world still comes from China's refineries. Currently, there are four domestic magnet factories in the United States nearing completion. Meanwhile, in neighboring Canada, New Performance Materials Company has just launched a large factory in Narva, Estonia. The capacity of this factory is almost twice that of Europe and the United States, and could reach 5,000 tons. However, The New York Times' report also points out that a complete transformation will take several years. North America and Europe purchase nearly 40,000 tons of rare earth magnets each year. Therefore, establishing magnet factories in the United States and some other countries seems to be a way out to break free from China's predicament. However, China's dominant position is rooted in decades of investment and almost complete control over rare earth processing. It manufactures most of the refining equipment in the world and employs almost all the professional technicians. Some analysts say that to completely break free from this constraint will take several years or even ten years.

Ministry of Commerce Announcement No. 62 of 2025: Announcement of the Decision on Implementing Export Control on Related Technologies of Rare Earths   To safeguard national security and interests, in accordance with relevant provisions of the "Export Control Law of the People's Republic of China" and the "Regulations on the Export Control of Dual-Use Items of the People's Republic of China", and upon approval by the State Council, it is decided to implement export control on related technologies and other items of rare earths. The relevant provisions are as follows: I. The following items are prohibited from export without permission: (1) Technologies related to rare earth mining, separation and refining, metal smelting, magnetic material manufacturing, and recycling and utilization of secondary rare earth resources, as well as their carriers; (Control Code: 1E902.a) (2) Technologies related to the assembly, commissioning, maintenance, repair, and upgrading of production lines for rare earth mining, separation and refining, metal smelting, magnetic material manufacturing, and recycling and utilization of secondary rare earth resources.(Control Code: 1E902.b) For the export of non-regulated goods, technologies or services, if the exporter knows that they will be used or substantially contribute to the activities of overseas rare earth mining, separation, metal smelting, magnetic material manufacturing, and recycling and utilization of secondary rare earth resources, they shall, in accordance with Article 12 of the "Export Control Law of the People's Republic of China" and Article 14 of the "Regulations on the Export Control of Dual-Use Items of the People's Republic of China", apply to the Ministry of Commerce for an export license of dual-use items before the export. Without permission, no such items shall be provided. The meanings and scopes of "rare earth", "separation", "metal smelting", "secondary rare earth resources" as mentioned in this announcement shall be implemented in accordance with the relevant provisions of the "Regulations on the Management of Rare Earths of the People's Republic of China". The technology of "magnetic material manufacturing" as mentioned in this announcement refers to the manufacturing technologies of samarium-cobalt, neodymium-iron-boron, and cerium magnets. The technology and its carriers, including technical-related materials and data such as design drawings, process specifications, process parameters, processing procedures, simulation data, etc. II. The term "exporters" as used in this announcement includes Chinese citizens, legal persons and unincorporated organizations, as well as all natural persons, legal persons and unincorporated organizations within the territory of China. The term "export" as used in this announcement refers to the transfer of the controlled items listed in this announcement from within the territory of the People's Republic of China to outside the country, or the provision to foreign organizations or individuals within or outside the territory of China, including trade exports as well as any transfer or provision carried out through means such as intellectual property licensing, investment, exchange, gift-giving, exhibition, display, testing, inspection, assistance, teaching, joint research and development, employment or hiring, consultation, etc.  III. Exporters shall, in accordance with the provisions of Article 16 of the "Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Export Control of Dual-Use Items", apply to the Ministry of Commerce for export licenses; for the export of technologies, exporters shall, in addition, submit the "Statement on the Transfer or Provision of Controlled Exported Technologies" as required in Appendix 1; when providing the controlled technologies within the territory of the People's Republic of China to foreign organizations or individuals located within the territory, they shall, in addition, submit the "Statement on the Provision of Controlled Exported Technologies within the Territory" as required in Appendix 2. Exporters shall use the license documents in accordance with the provisions of Article 18 and other regulations of the "Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Export Control of Dual-Use Items", and fulfill the reporting obligations as required by the license. IV. Exporters should enhance their compliance awareness, understand the performance indicators, main uses, etc. of the goods, technologies and services to be exported, and determine whether they fall under dual-use items. If it is impossible to determine whether the items to be transferred or provided belong to the items subject to this announcement, or it is impossible to determine whether the relevant circumstances are subject to this announcement, they can consult the Ministry of Commerce. V. No entity or individual shall provide any intermediary, facilitation, agency, freight transportation, delivery, customs declaration, third-party e-commerce platform, or financial services for acts that violate this announcement. If the services provided may involve the export of controlled items under this announcement, the service provider shall proactively inquire of the service recipient whether the export activities are subject to the jurisdiction of this announcement, whether they are applying for export licenses or have obtained license documents; for export operators who have already obtained dual-use item export licenses, they shall proactively present the license documents to the relevant service providers. VI. Technologies that have entered the public domain, technologies in basic scientific research, or technologies necessary for ordinary patent applications are not subject to the jurisdiction of this announcement. As of the effective date of this announcement, if uncontrolled technologies under this announcement that have not entered the public domain are disclosed to unspecified parties without permission, penalties shall be imposed in accordance with Article 34 of the "Export Control Law of the People's Republic of China". VII. Chinese citizens, legal persons, and unincorporated organizations shall not provide any substantive assistance or support for activities related to the extraction, smelting separation, metal smelting, magnetic material manufacturing, and secondary resource recycling of rare earths from abroad without permission. Those who violate the requirements of this announcement will be punished in accordance with the relevant provisions of the "Export Control Law of the People's Republic of China" and the "Regulations on the Export Control of Dual-Use Items of the People's Republic of China". VIII. This announcement shall come into effect as of the date of its release. The "List of Dual-Use Items for Export Control of the People's Republic of China" shall be updated simultaneously.

When you're driving a quiet yet powerful new energy vehicle and gracefully overtake a fuel-powered car at the moment the green light turns on, have you ever wondered that the core of this surging power lies behind some rather "rustic" names? They are rare earths. They are not ordinary soil, but a collective term for 17 kinds of metal elements, each being a "vitamin" and "magic powder" for modern industry. Today, let's lift the hood of a new energy vehicle and see exactly where these "magic powders" are and what kind of alchemy they perform.   Magic Spell One: The "Perpetual Motion" Core of the Power Heart - Permanent Magnet Synchronous Motor The most fundamental difference between new energy vehicles and fuel vehicles lies in the fact that the "heart" has changed from an engine to a motor. Currently, the vast majority of high-performance electric vehicles on the market, such as Tesla Model 3/Y and BYD Han, all choose to use permanent magnet synchronous motors. Here, the "permanent magnet" is where the magic of rare earths comes into play. Imagine the interior of a motor: the core component is a high-speed rotating rotor. To make the rotor spin, a strong magnetic field needs to be generated using magnets. If ordinary magnets are used, it's like trying to attract a large iron block with a small magnet, which is both laborious and has limited magnetic force. However, when elements like neodymium and praseodymium from the rare earth family are added to create neodymium-iron-boron permanent magnets, the situation is completely different. It is currently the strongest permanent magnet discovered by humans and is known as the "Magnetic King". How strong is it? Under the same volume, the magnetic energy product of neodymium-iron-boron magnets is more than ten times that of ordinary ferrite magnets! This is like giving the motor's rotor a "Superman suit", allowing it to generate an extremely powerful magnetic field with an extremely small volume and weight. · What benefits does it bring? 1. Strong power, quick response: A powerful magnetic field means greater torque, which is why electric vehicles start and accelerate so rapidly, and the sense of acceleration comes on instantly. 2. Compact design, high efficiency: Due to the strong magnetic force, the motor can be made very compact, saving more space for the battery or the passenger cabin in the vehicle. At the same time, its energy conversion efficiency is extremely high, usually exceeding 95%, far exceeding the 40% of fuel engines, which means less electrical energy is wasted as heat and is directly converted into the driving range.   3. Quiet and Smooth: Without the rumbling and vibration of the engine, the motor operates extremely quietly, enhancing the driving experience. It can be said that without rare earth permanent magnet materials, it would be difficult to have such an efficient, powerful and compact new energy vehicle motor as we have today. It is the "soul" of the power heart of electric vehicles.   Magic 2: The "Longevity Enhancement" Secret of the Energy Repository - Power Batteries Having talked about the power heart, let's now take a look at the energy repository - batteries. Rare earths play the role of "backstage heroes" here. Although their usage is not large, their effects are crucial. In the positive electrode materials of ternary lithium batteries, adding trace amounts of rare earth elements, such as lanthanum and cerium, can act as "stabilizers" and "improvers". · Enhance Lifespan: During the repeated charging and discharging process of the battery, its internal structure will gradually collapse, leading to a decrease in capacity. The addition of rare earth elements is like adding "reinforcing ribs" to the battery's framework, effectively stabilizing the crystal structure and slowing down the aging process, thereby extending the battery's service life. · Improve Safety: Rare earth elements can also enhance the thermal stability of the positive electrode materials, making the battery more "calm" in extreme conditions such as high temperatures, reducing the risk of thermal runaway, and providing an additional layer of safety. So, although rare earths do not directly provide electrical energy, they are like a meticulous "battery caretaker", silently safeguarding the health and safety of the battery, allowing your car to run longer and more safely.   Magic 3: The "Invisible" Driving Force of Lightweighting and Intelligence An excellent electric vehicle should not only be fast and have a long range, but also be smart and energy-efficient. Rare earths have played a significant role in these two aspects. · Lightweighting of the vehicle body: Adding rare earths to lightweight materials such as aluminum and magnesium can significantly improve their processing performance and strength. This allows vehicle components to become lighter while still being sturdy and reliable. Every slight reduction in vehicle weight contributes positively to improving the range. · Electronic control system: The numerous sensors, micro-motors, speakers, and other electronic components on the vehicle all rely on small rare earth magnets and rare earth elements. They are the foundation for implementing various intelligent driving assistance functions and providing high-quality audio and video experiences.

London, September 25 (Argus) - China's licensing control over rare earth exports has plunged overseas markets into a severe supply shortage, prompting some buyers to pay higher prices for larger inventories. Spot prices for yttrium oxide delivered to Europe have jumped again. Prices of other rare earth products in Europe have fluctuated less this week.   Light Rare Earth: Over the past week, the prices of rare earths neodymium/praseodymium have slightly declined. The reason is that the pace of inventory replenishment by downstream magnetic material factories in China has slowed down, and the rumor of increased supply of rare earth ores has led to a slightly pessimistic sentiment in the market, which has permeated the international market and slightly depressed the delivery prices of light rare earth products. The European price of 99.5-99.9% neodymium oxide dropped by 2 dollars this week to 91-94 dollars per kilogram, while the European price of 99% neodymium metal remained stable at 115.50-117.50 dollars per kilogram. The European price of 99.5-99.9% praseodymium oxide fell by 50 cents to 92-94.50 dollars per kilogram, and the European price of 99% neodymium praseodymium oxide slightly dropped to 82.50-85 dollars per kilogram.   Heavy Rare Earth: Due to the continuous tightness of the spot supply and the convergence of purchase and selling prices at significantly higher levels, the weekly estimated landed price of 99.999% yttrium oxide in Europe this week has jumped from $90 - $105 per kilogram a week ago to $150 - $200 per kilogram. Some market participants believe that due to the extremely tight supply outside China and the continuous inquiries from buyers, some suppliers may even quote prices for yttrium oxide higher than $200 per kilogram. However, due to the supply shortage, the liquidity of spot supply this month is low, and many customers who want to purchase yttrium oxide and metallic yttrium have not been able to obtain the goods because suppliers have difficulty procuring products to meet market demand. Some buyers are willing to purchase at exceptionally high prices to meet critical demands, but the quantity of high-priced transactions is limited, and this price is also difficult to have market representativeness.

Reuters reported that amid the escalating global tensions over critical minerals supply, the G7's technical team held a closed-door meeting in Chicago in mid-September to discuss a series of measures to counter China's dominance in rare earths. The core of the meeting revolved around setting a price floor for rare earths, carbon taxes or tariffs based on energy usage ratios, as well as investment regulations and geographical procurement restrictions. This development highlights the urgent concerns of Western countries over supply chain security, but also exposes the internal divisions and implementation challenges within the G7. The meeting came at a time when European companies were once again facing supply bottlenecks after China implemented rare earth export controls in April, seen as retaliation against US tariffs. Although China subsequently expedited the issuance of licenses to the EU, the delays in approval still posed potential risks of production halts. The G7's discussions stemmed from the "Critical Minerals Action Plan" launched in June, aimed at reducing reliance on China. Australia's participation as an observer in the meeting underscored the role of resource-rich countries in the global game. Key points of the meeting: A multi-pronged approach from investment regulation to trade tools The Chicago meeting focused on the reality that G7 countries (excluding Japan) are highly dependent on China for rare earth magnets and battery metals, aiming to reshape supply chains through economic and regulatory means. According to informed sources, no consensus was reached in the discussions, but the following points have become the focus: Price floor and subsidy mechanism: The G7 is considering a government subsidy-supported minimum price for rare earths to encourage domestic production. The US Department of Defense has set a price threshold of $110 per kilogram for rare earths, which is much higher than the market price in China. Australia is independently evaluating similar measures to support local key mineral projects; Canada is in an optimistic stance but has not made a commitment. EU officials stated that they are exploring price floors, joint procurement, and G7 internal reciprocal agreements. Carbon tax or tariff proposals: The meeting discussed imposing a carbon tax or tariff on China's rare earth and minor metal exports based on the proportion of non-renewable energy usage. This is intended to punish China's high-carbon production methods while incentivizing green investment. A Trump administration official said that the US is coordinating broader trade measures with the G7 and the EU to prevent "rare earth price dumping", including tariffs and price floors. Investment and geographical restrictions: The core issue is to raise the regulatory threshold for foreign investment in key materials to prevent companies from "flowing to China". Another option is geographical restrictions, such as mandatory local content requirements in public procurement or prohibiting purchases from specific countries like China, but there are significant differences in opinions among G7 countries, with Japan being cautious due to its lower dependence on China. Strategic reserves and joint actions: The EU Industry Commissioner suggested establishing a joint inventory of rare earths similar to oil reserves. The meeting also mentioned embedding ESG (Environment, Social, and Governance) standards into supply chains in the G7 action plan. The Canadian Department of Natural Resources and the White House did not immediately respond to inquiries. Analysts pointed out that the meeting reflects the G7's shift from passive response to active reshaping, but internal coordination is difficult and it is unlikely to be implemented in the short term. This meeting marks a shift from resource competition to rule-based negotiation for rare earths. The G7's action plan emphasizes transparency and sustainability, but success depends on coordination and investment scale. For China, this is not only a challenge but also an opportunity to promote green upgrading and diversified exports. The global rare earth landscape is transforming from a "China-centered" model to a multi-polar one. It is expected that by 2030, a more resilient supply chain ecosystem will be formed.

Recently, Suzuki Motor Corporation of Japan announced that due to rare earth material issues, some of its car production lines have temporarily ceased operations. The company's statement pointed out that the shortage of components mainly affects the electronic systems and engine parts of automobiles, directly impacting production plans. Besides Suzuki, the Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers also issued an emergency notice, stating that the inventories of rare earth magnets of India's three major automakers, Tata, Maruti Suzuki, and Mahindra, can only sustain normal production for three days. If the shortage is not replenished in time, a complete shutdown of the Indian automotive industry is inevitable. Ford Motor Company also had to suspend the production of its main SUV model, the Explorer, at the end of May for the same reason.   CITIC Securities stated that the rare earth industry has recently received multiple positive signals, and domestic rare earth prices have risen accordingly, gradually narrowing the price gap between domestic and international markets. Previously, export controls led to a significant increase in overseas rare earth prices, while domestic prices lagged behind, creating a significant price difference. With marginal policy adjustments, the domestic supply and demand situation has continued to improve, and the growth in downstream demand from new energy and humanoid robots has further highlighted the strategic value of rare earths. Additionally, disruptions in supply from Myanmar and changes in domestic quota policies also need attention. Under the dual drivers of "policy and demand", the industry has long-term investment value.   Zhongtai Securities stated that Tesla's humanoid robot Optimus is expected to enter mass production in 2025, with an estimated production volume of 50,000 to 100,000 units by 2026. Assuming a unit usage of 2,000 to 4,000 grams of neodymium iron boron per humanoid robot, if the production reaches 100 million units in the long term, the demand for magnetic materials will reach 200,000 to 400,000 tons, equivalent to creating another rare earth permanent magnet market, with a vast market space.

When you pick up an iPhone 17 Pro and enjoy its dazzling screen, smooth touch feedback and clear night photos, you may not have thought that behind these high-tech experiences lies an "invisible magic" - rare earth functional materials. These unassuming materials, weighing only 0.1-0.2% of the iPhone (about 0.2-0.5 grams), determine the phone's performance and experience. Today, let's uncover which rare earth functional materials are in the iPhone, where they are used, and how "magical" they are!   Rare earth functional materials: small size, big role Rare earth functional materials are compounds made from rare earth elements (17 kinds of metals, such as neodymium, europium, lanthanum, etc.). With their unique magnetic, luminescent and optical properties, they have become the "soul components" of smartphones. An iPhone 17 Pro mainly uses 5-6 kinds of rare earth functional materials, totaling about 0.2-0.5 grams of rare earth elements (equivalent to a grain of rice). Although the amount is small, they make the iPhone's screen more vivid, vibration more precise, and the lens clearer. Here is a "family photo" of these materials!   1. Neodymium-Iron-Boron Permanent Magnets: The "Power Core" of Vibration and Sound Quality - Rare Earth Elements: Neodymium (Nd), Praseodymium (Pr), Dysprosium (Dy), Terbium (Tb) - Usage: Approximately 0.15-0.3 grams (rare earth content: 0.05-0.1 grams) - Applications:   - Speakers: Neodymium-Iron-Boron (NdFeB) is the world's strongest permanent magnet, enabling the iPhone's speaker to produce powerful sound quality in a small volume. Whether listening to music or watching movies, the bass is rich and forceful.   - Taptic Engine: The "click" sensation when you tap the screen and the vibration for notifications are all driven by precise feedback from NdFeB magnets. Dysprosium and terbium ensure the magnet remains stable at high temperatures.   - Camera Focus Motor: Quick focusing and capturing clear night scenes rely on the movement of the lens driven by magnets. - Little Secret: NdFeB accounts for 60-70% of the rare earth usage in iPhones, making it the "usage champion."   2. Rare earth phosphors: The "color tuner" of the screen - Rare earth elements: Europium (Eu), Terbium (Tb), Yttrium (Y) - Usage amount: Approximately 0.02 - 0.05 grams - Where used: The backlight or luminescent layer of the display (OLED or LCD). Europium brings out vivid red, Terbium provides pure green, and Yttrium enhances the fluorescence efficiency, making the screen colors of the iPhone more vivid and with higher contrast, such as "Sunset Red" or "Forest Green" can be accurately reproduced. - Secret tip: OLED screens use less phosphors than LCDs, but rare earths are still needed to ensure accurate colors. The reason your iPhone screen is "pleasing to the eyes" is all thanks to this tiny "color-tuning agent"!   3. Lanthanide optical glass: The "vision guardian" of lenses and screens - Rare earth elements: Lanthanum (La), Cerium (Ce) - Usage amount: Approximately 0.01 - 0.03 grams - Where used:   - Camera lenses: The three-camera system of iPhone 17 Pro (wide-angle, ultra-wide-angle, telephoto) uses lanthanum glass. Due to its high refractive index and low dispersion, it can reduce light scattering, making night scenes clearer and colors more realistic.   - Display protection glass: Such as Ceramic Shield, which contains trace amounts of lanthanum, enhances anti-reflection performance and reduces glare. - Secret tip: Lanthanide glass makes the lenses thinner but more powerful. It is the behind-the-scenes hero of the "black technology" of iPhone photography.   4. Cerium-based polishing powder: The "smooth magic" of screens and lenses - Rare earth element: Cerium (Ce) - Usage amount: Trace amount (

While China's exports of deep-processed rare earth products hit a single-month high in August since 2012, European companies are facing production halts due to supply shortages originating from China. On the 18th, the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China reported that European supply chains are being affected by the U.S.-China trade war, with inconsistent speeds in China’s export license approvals raising concerns that American firms may be receiving preferential treatment. Due to shortages of rare earth materials, European companies experienced seven production disruptions in August, with 46 additional halts anticipated in September. According to a report by Singapore’s Lianhe Zaobao, China holds an overwhelmingly dominant position in the global rare earth market, accounting for nearly 70% of global mining production in 2024. In particular, China controls 90% of the global production of rare earth magnets, which are critical for industries such as electric vehicles and wind turbines. In April 2025, China imposed export controls on certain rare earth products, leading to a sharp decline in supply and significantly disrupting global industrial chains. Although China’s exports of deep-processed rare earth products—including high-performance magnets used in products ranging from consumer goods to fighter aircraft—surged to 7,338 metric tons in August, a development viewed positively by the market following a call between the Chinese and U.S. heads of state, European companies say they have not benefited. Carlo D’Andrea, Vice President of the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, stated at a press conference in Shanghai, “We see movement, but it is extremely slow.” He described the supply bottleneck as the “number one challenge” currently facing the chamber’s members. European companies are concerned about inconsistent approval times for rare earth export licenses, with some firms reportedly obtaining permits in as little as two days, while others wait two months or longer. D’Andrea noted, “I know that U.S. companies are getting their licenses very quickly,” emphasizing that this is a bottleneck that China’s Ministry of Commerce could easily resolve. Foreign media reports indicate that 22 European companies have sought assistance from the chamber, hoping to expedite approval for a total of 141 urgent export applications submitted to China. In a related development, Reuters reported that John Moolenaar, Chairman of the U.S. House Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, urged the U.S. government on the 18th (Eastern Time) to restrict or suspend landing rights for Chinese airlines in the United States unless China fully restores the supply of rare earths and magnets. Additionally, the U.S. should review export control policies related to the sale of commercial aircraft, parts, and maintenance services to China. Moolenaar stated, “These measures would send a clear message to Beijing that they cannot cut off critical supplies for America’s defense industrial base while their strategic sectors remain unaffected.” Currently, due to persistently low demand for air travel between the U.S. and China, the number of flights actually operated by U.S. airlines to China represents only a small fraction of those approved.                            

As dual-use items for both military and civilian purposes, the control of rare earths is the fulfillment of international obligations and a contribution to world peace. Given China's leading position in the global rare earth industry and its unstoppable great rejuvenation, foreign media and national regulatory bodies in recent years have persistently hyped up a rare earth supply crisis. They attempt to portray China's contributions as a monopoly, stir up trade conflicts, and even provoke military conflicts over rare earth resources. This has created obstacles for the industry's development and management, unnecessarily increasing operational costs. Despite this, China continues to make every effort to meet legitimate global demand for rare earths.  

If China gains access to advanced chips, AI technology, and the dollar-based financial system, it will have an incentive to keep rare earths flowing. China’s weaponization of rare earths has become a major flashpoint in U.S.-China trade negotiations. These critical materials—particularly high-performance magnets—are essential components in electric vehicles, wind turbines, industrial robots, and advanced defense systems. In response to China’s stringent export controls on rare earths, the U.S. has quietly reduced tariffs, eased restrictions on AI chip exports, and even relaxed visa constraints for Chinese students. At the same time, the U.S. is scrambling to find alternative supplies. In July of this year, the U.S. Department of Defense announced a landmark multibillion-dollar investment plan to boost MP Materials, the company behind America’s flagship rare earth project. But what if, despite substantial subsidies and years of effort, the U.S. still cannot break free from its reliance on Chinese rare earths? Japan offers a cautionary tale. In response, the Japanese government implemented a series of strategic measures: investing in Australian rare earth producer Lynas Rare Earths; enhancing domestic recycling and R&D in alternative technologies; establishing its own commercial partnerships with Chinese magnet manufacturers; and building strategic reserves to buffer against future supply shocks. Yet 15 years later, more than 70% of Japan’s rare earth imports still come from China. China’s dominance in rare earths was not built overnight and will not be easily eroded. China’s advantage lies not in hoarding raw materials, but in its industrial capacity for large-scale refining, processing, and manufacturing. Today, China controls 85% to 90% of global rare earth smelting capacity and produces approximately 90% of the world’s high-performance rare earth magnets. It is the only country with a fully vertically integrated rare earth supply chain—from mining to chemical separation to magnet manufacturing. China’s manufacturing prowess has not only given it industrial leadership but also a technological moat. From 1950 to 2018, China filed over 25,000 rare earth-related patents—more than double the number filed by the United States. Decades of accumulated expertise in the complex chemistry and metallurgy of rare earth processing have created a knowledge base that Western firms cannot easily replicate. Moreover, in December 2023, the Chinese government moved to consolidate its leading position by imposing a comprehensive export ban on technologies underlying rare earth mining, separation, and magnet production. China’s lax environmental regulations have also given Chinese companies a significant advantage over Western competitors. In 2002, California’s Mountain Pass Rare Earth Mine was forced to halt refining operations due to a toxic waste spill. In contrast, China’s more permissive regulatory environment has allowed rapid expansion of rare earth production with fewer delays and far lower costs. Critically, choke points in rare earth supply are not static; they evolve with technology. China understands this and is patiently waiting as the West’s dependence on rare earth magnets grows exponentially amid the global green energy transition, which is driving massive demand for electric vehicles and wind turbines. Even if the West succeeds in building a parallel supply chain for today’s rare earth needs, future bottlenecks may emerge elsewhere. For instance, quantum computing increasingly relies on rare isotopes such as ytterbium-171, as well as elements like erbium and yttrium. These emerging applications could become the next pressure point, forcing the U.S. and its allies into another race to catch up. Thus, the U.S. must confront an uncomfortable truth: China’s dominance in rare earths is likely to persist for the foreseeable future. Defensive strategies like supply chain diversification may address some vulnerabilities, but true resilience requires an offensive strategy that enhances U.S. leverage. The U.S. still holds many valuable cards. As long as China controls technologies or infrastructure that it cannot do without—whether advanced chips, cutting-edge AI models, or access to the dollar-based financial system—China will have a strong incentive to keep rare earths flowing. Yet for years, the U.S. has been moving in the opposite direction: gradually decoupling from China and restricting the flow of key technologies. Since the first Trump administration, U.S. strategy has involved blacklisting leading Chinese tech companies and tightening export controls on cutting-edge chips. While these measures initially hampered firms like Huawei and ZTE (HK:763) and slowed the country’s AI development, they have proven difficult to enforce. Riddled with loopholes, they have created opportunities for regulatory arbitrage. As outgoing U.S. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo acknowledged in December 2024, “Trying to block China is futile.” At the same time, U.S. export controls have spurred China’s efforts to develop domestic alternatives, effectively accelerating the rise of national champions like Huawei. Rather than strengthening U.S. influence over China, these policies have gradually eroded it. Recent policy shifts suggest this realization is beginning to take hold. The Trump administration’s decision to ease restrictions on sales of Nvidia’s H20 chips to China marks a move away from blanket bans toward more targeted engagement. Counterintuitively, such engagement may be a smarter way to de-risk. The more China depends on U.S. technology, the more entangled their supply chains become, and the harder it becomes for China to weaponize its strategic assets—including rare earths. Angela Huyue Zhang, Professor of Law at the University of Southern California, is the author of High Wire: How China Regulates Big Tech and Governs Its Economy (Oxford University Press, 2024) and Chinese Antitrust Exceptionalism: How the Rise of China Challenges Global Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2021). This commentary — “Rare Earths Are China’s Trump Card” — is published with the permission of Project Syndicate.  

On September 11, 2025, UBS Securities released "China's Sustainable Development - Summary of the China Rare Earth Experts' Conference". The conference invited senior experts with over a decade of experience in the rare earth permanent magnet industry to deeply analyze the market pattern of China's rare earths and its impact on the global supply chain. The final conclusion of the conference summary: China's dominant position in global rare earth reserves and the refining process is unlikely to be shaken in the short term.   Ⅰ. In the long term, the price of rare earths will remain stable with a slight upward trend.   The meeting minutes hold that, from the perspective of the entire supply chain, China's dominant position in rare earths is not only reflected in upstream mining but also in the core refining and separation stage, which has formed a "moat". Coupled with structural demand drivers, in the long term, rare earth prices are expected to remain stable with a slight upward trend.   1.On the supply side: mining accounts for 60-70%, and refining for 90%. UBS experts point out that China currently contributes 60-70% of the global rare earth ore production, but more crucially, it holds about 90% of the global capacity in the refining and separation process, with a technological lead over overseas counterparts by at least 20 years. The cost advantage is also significant: China's refining and separation costs are only one-third of those of overseas peers. This "technology + cost" dual barrier makes the global rare earth supply highly dependent on China. 2. Demand side: Electric vehicles, wind power, and robots form the "three driving forces" · Electric vehicles: Each electric vehicle requires 3.5 kilograms of neodymium-praseodymium (NdPr) for its traction motor. · Wind power: Each wind turbine needs 600 kilograms of neodymium-iron-boron (NdFeB) permanent magnets. · Humanoid robots and low-altitude aviation: As emerging fields, the demand for rare earth permanent magnets is rapidly increasing.   Ⅱ. Overseas rare earth projects are unlikely to shake China's dominance.   Although overseas enterprises are attempting to undermine China's dominance in the rare earth sector, experts from UBS believe that overseas rare earth projects are confronted with multiple challenges such as high costs, limited scale, and significant environmental pressures. Therefore, it will be difficult for them to challenge China's position in the short term.   1. Typical Cases: MP Materials (USA), Lynas (Australia) · MP Materials: Although it is a strategic project in the USA, its commercial feasibility is questionable - the refining and separation cost is at least 40% higher than that in China. The current actual scale is only 1,000 tons, far below the target of 10,000 tons, and it is highly dependent on government subsidies. Experts predict that it will be difficult to achieve profitability in the next 5 years; · Lynas (Australia): The analyst of UBS Rare Earths believes that it can maintain profitability without subsidies and is a relatively competitive project overseas. However, it still faces environmental compliance pressure, and the supply of heavy rare earths still relies on China. 2. Core Conclusion: The reliance on heavy rare earths is unlikely to change in the short term. Experts stress that overseas projects are more of a "strategic backup". In the field of heavy rare earths, China's dominant position in supply will remain for the time being - overseas heavy rare earth mining and refining technologies are not mature and the costs are too high, making it difficult to form an effective alternative.   Ⅲ.The rare earth recycling alternative technology is still just a theoretical concept.   In the context of limited rare earth supply, the recycling industry is becoming an important supplement. Meanwhile, the so-called alternative technologies that the market is concerned about will not have a substantive impact for at least the next decade.   1. China accounts for 60% of global rare earth recycling. UBS experts have pointed out that China is rapidly establishing a "closed-loop recycling system" for rare earths. Currently, it accounts for 60% of the global rare earth recycling volume, with a recovery rate of 90-95%. The main sources include electric vehicle motors, wind turbine blades, and electronic waste. Experts predict that by 2028, the recycling of rare earths is expected to meet approximately 35% of the global supply demand, effectively alleviating the pressure on primary mines. In contrast, in the United States and Europe, due to backward recycling technologies and high environmental costs, the progress of the recycling industry has lagged significantly. 2. Risk of substitution: Still in the research and development stage, unlikely to take off within the next ten years The alternative materials that the market is focusing on (such as ferrite, alnico, and nitrides) are all currently at the stage of laboratory research. Their performance and cost cannot compete with those of rare earth permanent magnets. Experts predict that within the next ten years, alternative technologies will be difficult to have a substantial impact on the demand for rare earths.

Recently, the 2025 East Asia Marine Expo, themed "From Blue to Future - Blue Ocean and Technology", was held in Qingdao, Shandong Province. This expo brought together over 450 enterprises and institutions to showcase the latest achievements in marine engineering, technological equipment, marine biomedicine and other fields. Among them, two samples of deep-sea rare earth-rich sediments were particularly eye-catching. Deep-sea rare earth-rich sediments (referred to as "deep-sea rare earths") have gained significant attention as a newly discovered type of rare earth resource in recent years due to their huge resource potential. The reported deep-sea rare earth-rich sediments are mainly distributed in four ocean areas: the Western Pacific, the Central-Northeast Pacific, the Southeast Pacific and the Central Indian Ocean. The rare earth-rich sediment samples on display were discovered by scientists from the First Institute of Oceanography of the Ministry of Natural Resources in the Central Indian Ocean Basin. According to relevant international laws, the first party to discover a marine resource has the priority to apply for its exploitation.  

David Shaul's article in "The National Interest" magazine hits a core fact: China indeed dominates the rare earth industry, especially in processing and magnet production. Approximately 90% of rare earth magnets come from China - the bottleneck for electric vehicles, wind turbines, defense systems, and semiconductors. The reminder that China banned the export of rare earths to Japan in 2010 is historically accurate, and the risk of China taking further action remains credible. Similarly, emphasizing the partnership between the US Department of Defense and MP Materials Corporation is based on facts; this project does aim to rebuild domestic capabilities. The claim that Ford Motor Company "had to temporarily close a factory in Chicago in April 2025 due to a shortage of rare earth magnets" is worth examining. Although the Rare Earth Exchange (REEx) reported some effects - possibly a slowdown - we cannot be certain of a complete shutdown. We do not have independent evidence to confirm this situation. Although US manufacturers are undoubtedly facing supply gaps, regarding it as a direct consequence of China's embargo might exaggerate the existing evidence. The author vividly and almost existentialistically depicts the vulnerability of the United States: China is "the most significant national security threat", and rare earths are "weapons waiting to be unleashed". Although Shaul's article is somewhat sharp, it emphasizes a key theme: The United States still lags far behind China in rare earth smelting, magnet production, and midstream production capacity. Any escalation of the trade war could affect the automotive, defense, and clean energy sectors.  

KUALA LUMPUR: Malaysia is in talks with China on rare earth cooperation to expand local refining capacity after the government banned the export of unprocessed materials. The secretary-general of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Dato' Noor Azmi Dizon, said negotiations were difficult as China's policy is to only import raw materials and does not allow its processing plants or technology to be transferred abroad. "The issue with rare earths is the technology, which is held by China," he said today at a Brown Bag talk at the Malaysian Institute of Economic Research (MIER) titled "RMK13: Policy Empowerment to Maintain Economic Growth". Noor Azmi was responding to a participant's concern that Malaysia relies on exporting raw materials such as bauxite rather than processing them locally, where high-value-added products like aluminium can generate higher returns. He stressed that Malaysia has adopted a policy to stop the export of bauxite and rare earths. "Of course, currently we have suspended the export of raw materials. Whether it's bauxite or rare earths," he said. Noor Azmi explained that Malaysia hopes to maintain a balance of cooperation between Lynas in Australia (which is already operating in the country) and potential cooperation with China. "Our intention is to have both. We consider Australia as Western, but we also need to have a Chinese component in Malaysia," he said. It is estimated that Malaysia's huge rare earth reserves are worth more than US$200 billion (RM844 billion), but the country lacks the technology to process rare earths. Last month, Malaysia banned the export of unprocessed rare earths. The Minister of Investment, Trade and Industry, Tengku Dato' Seri Zafrul Abdul Aziz, said the government hopes international companies will invest in downstream processing in Malaysia instead of shipping raw materials abroad. He said the government is positioning Malaysia as a processing hub rather than a raw material supplier. Tengku Zafrul said Lynas, the Australian rare earth company, is one of the companies currently allowed to export rare earths from Malaysia. The company processes rare earths in Gebeng, Pahang, and mines in Gua Musang, Kelantan. Rare earths are crucial for electric vehicles, renewable energy technologies and electronics, and China dominates the global supply chain. Although China's mineral production accounts for about 70% of the global total, the Chinese government controls nearly 90% of the global processing business, and its refining and separation technologies are almost monopolized and not exported. According to the US Geological Survey, 70% of the rare earths imported by the United States in 2024 came from China, followed by 13% from Malaysia, 6% from Japan, and 5% from Estonia. Some supplies outside China still come from concentrates processed in China and Australia. He emphasized that Malaysia has adopted a policy to stop the export of bauxite and rare earths.  

You pick up your phone, browse the news, and take a photo. You might never have thought that these seemingly ordinary actions are actually tied to a mysterious yet crucial resource - rare earths. The name sounds a bit earthy, even a bit "rustic", but it is the "invisible king" of modern technology and industry. From smartphones and electric vehicles to missile guidance and satellite communications, even wind power generation, none of them can do without it. The global race for rare earths has quietly evolved into a war without gunsmoke.   Rare earths are not "earth", but a collective term for 17 kinds of metal elements. They are hidden in the earth's crust, widely distributed but difficult to extract. The reason they are called "rare earths" is not because they are rare, but because they are usually dispersed and rarely concentrated in easily accessible ore deposits. This is like looking for gold on the beach - sand is everywhere, but there are few places where you can actually dig out gold grains. The global reserves of rare earths are actually not small, but the number of countries with economically viable extraction conditions is very limited.   China holds the absolute leading position in this rare earth race. More than 60% of the world's rare earth reserves are in China, and an even higher proportion of the refining and processing capacity is also concentrated here. The Bayan Obo mining area in Inner Mongolia is one of the world's largest rare earth mines, and China almost monopolizes the supply of medium and heavy rare earths. This is like holding the "vital point" of the global technology industry in the palm of your hand - no matter how good your chip design or advanced your weapons are, without rare earths, many key components cannot be produced.   But the importance of rare earths goes far beyond this. For example, neodymium-iron-boron permanent magnets are a star product of rare earth applications. When used in motors, they can make electric vehicles run longer and make the vibration of mobile phones more powerful. Elements like terbium and dysprosium are core materials for precision-guided weapons and radar systems. Without them, missiles may not hit their targets accurately, and the performance of fighter jets will be greatly reduced. For this reason, rare earths have long been listed as "strategic resources" by various countries and even called "industrial vitamins".   Over the past few decades, the global rare earth supply chain has been dominated by China alone. But this has also brought problems. Around 2010, China briefly restricted rare earth exports, and international prices soared. Japan, the United States, and Europe all jumped up and down. Since then, many countries have realized that relying on a single supply source is too dangerous! Thus, a global rare earth "decoupling" and diversification race has officially begun.   The United States hurriedly restarted the Mountain Pass mine in California, while Australia, Myanmar, and Vietnam also began to accelerate exploration and mining. Japan even went to the bottom of the sea to look for rare earths and invested heavily in recycling technology - "panning for gold" from old mobile phones and hard drives. Europe was not far behind, trying to open up new sources in Greenland, Sweden, and other places. But the problem is that mining rare earths is only the first step. The more difficult part is refining and processing. This process is complex and polluting. China has taken decades to form a mature system, and it is almost impossible for other countries to catch up in a short time. Apart from mining and environmental protection, technological competition is also quietly escalating. In recent years, China has continuously strengthened its control over the rare earth industry chain, extending step by step from mining, separation to material processing and device manufacturing. The United States and Japan, on the other hand, are trying to reduce their dependence through ally cooperation and technological substitution. For example, they are developing motors that use less or no rare earths and attempting to synthesize alternative materials. But in the short term, it is almost an impossible task to completely get rid of rare earths. The competition for rare earths in the future will only become more intense. With the explosive growth of industries such as new energy, artificial intelligence, and aerospace, the demand for rare earths is expected to continue to rise. While countries are seeking new supply sources and investing heavily in recycling technologies, they are also quietly competing through diplomatic and economic means. Rare earths are no longer simply a commodity trade but have become a strategic chip in the game among major powers.  

China has prohibited foreign companies from hoarding rare earth elements used in electric motors. The Chinese government controls exports to prevent overseas stockpiling, thereby maintaining its influence in the industry. UNN, citing the Financial Times, reported that China has warned Western companies against hoarding rare earth metals, or they may face the risk of more severe shortages. The Chinese government is currently strictly controlling the supply of rare earths, which are crucial for electric vehicles and other civilian and defense applications. DetailsAccording to two informed sources, China has banned foreign companies from stockpiling rare earth elements and their products, primarily magnets used in electric motors and other critical technologies, as concerns over Beijing’s export restrictions have driven up demand. One source stated, "The Chinese government has told companies that they cannot hoard large quantities of rare earth metals, or they will face shortages." Another informed source mentioned that Chinese authorities intend to limit the approved export volumes to prevent overseas stockpiling. "From now on, this will serve as leverage," they said. China dominates rare earth production, processing approximately 90% of the global supply and producing 94% of the world’s permanent magnets. During the trade war with the United States, China leveraged its control over this critical industry as a weapon. According to sources, Beijing’s efforts to prevent companies from hoarding large inventories will provide greater flexibility in addressing shortages and price fluctuations, indicating China’s determination to maintain maximum influence in the industry. In April, China added seven categories of medium and heavy rare earth elements to its export control list in response to former U.S. President Donald Trump’s "Liberation Day" tariffs. The report noted that this move, which also included permanent magnets and other finished products, led to shortages in many industries, including automotive. Although Washington and Beijing agreed this week to extend the tariff truce for another 90 days, China’s control over rare earth elements remains a significant part of the negotiations. Trump Delays High Tariffs on Chinese Goods by 90 Days"This is definitely still an issue," said a person familiar with the negotiations. The Chinese government controls the mining of rare earth elements through mining and processing quotas. Last year, quotas were allocated only to two state-owned enterprises. After complaints from U.S. and European officials and businesses about rare earth controls causing shortages, China has allowed a partial resumption of rare earth element flows. However, trade data and investigations show that exports are still tightly controlled. A survey conducted last month by the U.S.-China Business Council (USCBC) revealed that half of the member companies surveyed reported that the majority of their rare earth applications were pending approval or had been rejected. China’s Rare Earth Exports Increased by 60% in JuneChina exported 3,188 tons of rare earth permanent magnets in June, more than double the volume exported in May but 38% less than the same period last year. Since Beijing implemented trade restrictions, magnet exports over the three months ending in June were about half of what they were during the same period last year. The USCBC report noted that large orders, particularly "sudden surges exceeding the historical average of applicants, attract stricter scrutiny to prevent stockpiling." The report added, "Applications are also reviewed incrementally. Any discrepancies may lead to delays or rejections." Individuals involved in the application review process pointed out that due to long waiting times, industry associations and business lobbying groups often raise the most urgent needs with China’s Ministry of Commerce, which typically expedites applications from companies at the top of the list. This issue has led some Western companies to shift the manufacturing of finished products to China—an outcome that aligns with Beijing’s goal of strengthening control over the supply chain. Louis Pinkham, CEO of U.S. automaker Regal Rexnord Corp, stated that the company has moved some of its production to China to assemble rare earth magnet products there and facilitate their export.                

On Friday, China announced new provisional measures to strengthen control over rare earth mining and processing, expanding state oversight of materials critical for electric vehicles, smartphones, and defense applications.   The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology now requires companies involved in rare earth operations to obtain government approval and accurately report their production and processing volumes.   Violators will face legal penalties and potential quota reductions, though specific production and export quotas have not been disclosed. The new regulations apply to both domestically mined rare earths and those imported into China for refining.   China supplies nearly 90% of the world’s refined rare earths, despite accounting for only 70% of global mining output and holding nearly half of the world’s known reserves.   In 2024, 70% of the United States' rare earths came from China, highlighting its dependence on China despite efforts by the Trump administration to diversify supplies.   The new measures cover products including wind turbines, mobile cranes, heavy equipment, railcars, furniture, compressors, and pumps.   The regulations also impose stricter environmental standards for rare earth mining and processing activities.  

Lianhe Zaobao, August 25 — After China issued the "Interim Measures for the Management of Total Control over Rare Earth Mining and Rare Earth Smelting Separation," requiring rare earth producers to establish a product traceability system, the share prices of multiple Chinese rare earth companies surged on Monday (August 25). China Northern Rare Earth, listed in Shanghai, closed nearly 10% higher. Zhejiang Zhongke Magnetic Industry, listed on the Growth Enterprise Market, saw its shares surge 12% during trading and closed 6.49% higher. China Rare Earth Group Resources Technology, listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange Main Board, rose 8.5% during trading and closed 6.19% higher. JL MAG Rare-Earth, listed in Hong Kong, saw its shares soar 18% during trading and was up 14.85% as of 3:30 p.m. China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) published the interim measures on its official website last Friday (August 22). The regulations stipulate that the state will implement total control management over rare earth mining (including rare earth mineral products, etc.) and the smelting separation of various rare earth mineral products (including monazite concentrate) obtained through mining, imports, and processing of other minerals. The MIIT, in conjunction with the Ministry of Natural Resources and the National Development and Reform Commission, will study and propose annual total control indicators for rare earth mining and smelting separation based on factors such as national economic development goals, the reserves and types of national rare earth resources, the development of the rare earth industry, ecological protection, and market demand. These indicators will be submitted to the State Council for approval. Rare earth producers are required to establish a rare earth product traceability system, accurately record the flow of rare earth products, and input the flow information of rare earth products from the previous month into the rare earth product traceability information system established by the MIIT and relevant departments by the 10th of each month.  

The European Union plans to create emergency reserves of critical minerals, including rare earth metals, along with cable repair kits. This decision comes amid growing concerns over the bloc’s vulnerability to attacks and hybrid threats. EU Aims to Establish Strategic Reserves of Rare Earths — Financial Times, July 5 As reported by the Financial Times and cited by United Nations News Agency, Brussels has announced its intention to build emergency reserves of critical minerals, including rare earth metals, as well as cable repair kits. The move reflects increasing worries about the EU’s exposure to risks. Details In a draft document outlining the reserve strategy, the European Commission stated: “The EU is facing an increasingly complex and deteriorating risk landscape, characterized by growing geopolitical tensions, including conflicts, intensified climate change impacts, environmental degradation, hybrid threats, and cyber threats.” The EU’s executive body emphasized that member states should coordinate the stockpiling of supplies such as food, medicines, and even nuclear fuel. It will also accelerate efforts to build EU-level reserves of materials such as cable repair modules “to ensure rapid recovery from disruptions in energy or optical cables,” as well as commodities critical to energy and defense systems, including rare earth metals and permanent magnets. — The publication noted. In recent years, several incidents of potential sabotage targeting subsea communication cables and gas pipelines have raised concerns about the vulnerability of critical infrastructure. This strategy is part of the EU’s broader efforts to enhance the security and stability of the 27-nation bloc. Last month, General Carsten Breuer, Inspector General of the German Armed Forces, warned that Russia could attack an EU member state within the next four years. The document highlighted that the high-risk environment is driven by “increased activities by hacktivists, cybercriminals, and state-backed groups.” The EU is also more vulnerable to climate change than many other regions, with warming occurring at twice the global average rate. This week, wildfires in Crete forced the evacuation of 5,000 people from the island. In a report commissioned by the EU in October, former Finnish President Sauli Niinistö stated that security should be treated as a “public good” and called for preparedness. Regarding reserves, he suggested that Brussels should “define targets to ensure a minimum level of preparedness for various crisis scenarios, including armed aggression or large-scale disruptions in global supply chains.” In March, the EU also recommended that households stockpile essential supplies to withstand crises for at least 72 hours. The EU already maintains a fleet of firefighting aircraft and helicopters across 22 member states, medical evacuation planes, and items such as field hospitals and critical medical supplies as part of its emergency disaster response efforts. However, the European Commission stated that it will establish a “network of stockpiles” to improve coordination among EU countries. The document noted that “there is limited consensus on what essential goods are needed for crisis preparedness in a rapidly changing risk environment.” It will also begin compiling regularly updated lists of essential supplies tailored to each region and type of crisis. The document added that EU member states should provide better incentives, such as tax reductions, to encourage the private sector to help build inventories. The EU must also collaborate with allies on “joint storage” and improve coordination with NATO on resource management and dual-use infrastructure. A new multiannual budget proposal, to be introduced later this month, will also address the need for investment in critical stockpiles. The draft document is expected to be published next week and may undergo revisions before being finalized.                

According to a report by Sputnik, Vietnam replaced India in July as China's fifth largest buyer of rare earth metals, while the United States dropped two positions in the rankings due to a decline in imports. Japan retained its top position, as it did a month earlier, with purchases nearly doubling to $13.8 million in July. The Netherlands secured the second spot with even more significant growth, as imports surged 1.6 times month-on-month to $7.073 million. The European country had ranked third just a month earlier. South Korea climbed to third place in July's rankings of the largest buyers of Chinese rare earth metals, rising one position. The neighboring country purchased rare earth metals worth $6.5 million from China, nearly three times the amount recorded in June. The United States fell from second place a month earlier to fourth, with purchases declining by 20% to $2.6 million. Vietnam replaced India to claim fifth place, thanks to a more than threefold increase in imports, which reached $1.3 million. Just a month ago, Vietnam ranked only tenth. India, with purchases declining by over 33% to $742,300 within a month, dropped out of the top five buyers of Chinese rare earth metals and fell to eighth place. Russia’s ranking remained unchanged from the previous month, holding the sixth position despite a slight decrease in import value ($897,000 as of June, down 6.6%).

Malaysia’s Acting Minister of Natural Resources and Environmental Sustainability, YBrs. Johari Abdul Ghani, disclosed on Wednesday that China is willing to provide technical and technological assistance to Malaysia in the field of rare earth processing. He emphasized that any collaboration would be strictly limited to state-owned enterprises from both countries. According to foreign media reports, Johari stated in a written parliamentary reply on Wednesday that China has expressed its support for Malaysia’s goals in developing its rare earth industry. “Given the critical importance of technology protection to China, the cooperation will exclusively involve government-linked enterprises from both nations,” he added. He also noted that current discussions are still at a preliminary stage, and no formal agreement has been reached between the two countries. Johari highlighted that given China’s dominant position in the global rare earth sector—particularly its advanced expertise in rare earth element separation technology—China’s assistance holds significant importance for Malaysia. Furthermore, Johari mentioned that this cooperation would enhance Malaysia’s international standing in the rare earth industry, making it the only country globally with access to both Chinese and non-Chinese rare earth processing technologies.

Source: China Rare Earth Network According to a report by Reuters cited by Mining.com, Indonesian President Prabowo has ordered the establishment of a new mining regulatory body responsible for overseeing the development of rare earth and radioactive materials. The head of the agency made this announcement to reporters on August 25. "This agency will be responsible for managing the strategic materials industry related to the defense sector, as strategic materials are crucial for national sovereignty and equally important for improving the national economy," said the head of the agency, Brian Yuliarto, who also serves as the Minister of Higher Education. Previously, he mentioned that rare earth metals are often found in the byproducts of nickel and tin processing. Indonesia has been attempting to process rare earth minerals discovered in tin ore, such as monazite. Indonesia is a major producer of tin and nickel, with abundant reserves of critical minerals and rare earth elements.

(Promulgated by Order No. 71 of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the National Development and Reform Commission, and the Ministry of Natural Resources on July 28, 2025, effective as of the date of promulgation.)   Article 1 These Measures are formulated in accordance with the Mineral Resources Law of the People’s Republic of China, the Rare Earth Management Regulations, and other relevant laws, administrative regulations, and state provisions, to strengthen the administration of total quantity control for rare earth mining and smelting separation. Article 2 For the purposes of these Measures, "rare earth mining" refers to the production process of mining and beneficiating various types of rare earth raw ores, such as bastnaesite, ion-adsorption rare earth ores, and mixed rare earth ores, to produce rare earth mineral products. "Rare earth smelting separation" refers to the production process of processing rare earth mineral products to generate various types of single or mixed rare earth oxides, salts, and other compounds. Article 3 The state implements total quantity control management for rare earth mining (including rare earth mineral products, etc.) and for the smelting separation of various types of rare earth mineral products (including monazite concentrate) obtained through mining, importation, or processing of other minerals. Article 4 The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, in conjunction with the Ministry of Natural Resources and the National Development and Reform Commission, is responsible for the national administration of total quantity control for rare earth mining and smelting separation. The competent departments of industry and information technology and natural resources of local people’s governments at or above the county level shall be responsible for the administration of total quantity control for rare earth mining and smelting separation within their respective administrative regions according to their duty assignments. Article 5 The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, in conjunction with the Ministry of Natural Resources and the National Development and Reform Commission, shall study and formulate annual total control indicators for rare earth mining and smelting separation (hereinafter referred to as the "total control indicators") based on factors such as national economic development goals, the reserves and variety differences of national rare earth resources, the development of the rare earth industry, ecological protection, and market demand, and submit them to the State Council for approval. Article 6 The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, in conjunction with the Ministry of Natural Resources, shall, based on the total control indicators approved by the State Council and comprehensively considering factors such as the production capacity, technical level, and environmental protection and safety performance of rare earth production enterprises, refine and allocate the total control indicators, issue them to rare earth mining enterprises and rare earth smelting separation enterprises (hereinafter collectively referred to as "rare earth production enterprises"), and notify the competent departments of industry and information technology and natural resources of the relevant provincial people’s governments. The competent departments of industry and information technology and natural resources of provincial people’s governments shall notify the competent departments of industry and information technology and natural resources of local people’s governments at or above the county level where the rare earth production enterprises are domiciled about the issuance of the total control indicators. Article 7 Rare earth production enterprises shall strictly comply with laws, administrative regulations, and relevant state provisions, and engage in rare earth mining and smelting separation within the scope of the total control indicators. Rare earth production enterprises shall be designated by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology in conjunction with the Ministry of Natural Resources. Except for enterprises designated in accordance with the preceding paragraph, no other organizations or individuals may engage in rare earth mining or rare earth smelting separation. Article 8 Rare earth production enterprises shall be responsible for the implementation of their respective total control indicators. Article 9 Rare earth production enterprises shall promptly report the monthly and annual implementation status of their total control indicators to the competent departments of industry and information technology and natural resources of the county-level people’s government where they are domiciled. The competent departments of industry and information technology and natural resources of local people’s governments at or above the county level shall compile the monthly and annual implementation status of the total control indicators of rare earth production enterprises within their administrative regions and promptly report them to the competent departments of industry and information technology and natural resources of the people’s government at the next higher level. Article 10 Rare earth production enterprises shall establish a rare earth product flow record system, accurately record rare earth product flow information, and input the flow information for the previous month into the rare earth product traceability information system established by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology in conjunction with relevant departments by the 10th day of each month. Article 11 Rare earth production enterprises shall fulfill their obligations for network and data security protection, establish and improve internal network and data security management systems, enhance the level of enterprise network and data security protection, and ensure the security of enterprise networks and data. Article 12 The competent departments of industry and information technology and natural resources of people’s governments at or above the county level shall strengthen supervision and inspection of the implementation of total control indicators, investigate and address violations in accordance with the law, strictly implement legal and administrative regulations as well as the State Council’s requirements for administrative inspections involving enterprises, and ensure that supervision and inspections are law-based, strictly standardized, fair and civil, precise and efficient. The competent departments of industry and information technology and natural resources of local people’s governments at or above the county level shall promptly report the investigation and handling of violations to the competent departments of industry and information technology and natural resources of the people’s government at the next higher level. The competent departments of industry and information technology and natural resources of provincial people’s governments shall, by the end of December each year, report the overall supervision and inspection of total control indicators within their administrative regions to the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and the Ministry of Natural Resources. Article 13 If a rare earth production enterprise violates the provisions of these Measures or refuses or obstructs the supervision and inspection department from performing its duties in accordance with the law, the competent departments of industry and information technology and natural resources of the people’s government at or above the county level shall, according to their duty assignments, order it to make corrections and impose penalties in accordance with the Mineral Resources Law of the People’s Republic of China, the Rare Earth Management Regulations, and other relevant laws and administrative regulations. Article 14 If a rare earth production enterprise violates the provisions of these Measures and is subject to administrative penalties, its total control indicators for the following year shall be reduced. Article 15 If staff members of the competent departments of industry and information technology, natural resources, or development and reform abuse their authority, neglect their duties, or engage in misconduct for personal gain in the administration of total quantity control for rare earth mining and smelting separation, they shall be subject to sanctions in accordance with the law. Article 16 Violations of these Measures that constitute violations of public security management shall be subject to public security administration penalties in accordance with the law; if a crime is constituted, criminal liability shall be pursued in accordance with the law. Article 17 These Measures shall take effect from the date of promulgation. The Notice on Issuing the Interim Measures for the Administration of Mandatory Rare Earth Production Planning (MIIT Raw [2012] No. 285) promulgated by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology on June 13, 2012, is simultaneously repealed.  

  In the summer of 2025, a piece of news shook global supply chains: China’s rare earth exports soared to 5,994 tons in July, a year-on-year increase of 21%, hitting a record high since the imposition of export controls earlier in the year. Behind this figure lies the technological rivalry between China, the U.S., Japan, and Europe, the rapid advancement of the new energy revolution, and China’s strategic shift from "resource exporter" to "technology exporter." 1. Who Is Buying China’s Rare Earths? Japan Leads, the U.S. Rushes to Stock Up Japan is the undisputed top buyer of Chinese rare earths. In the first half of 2025, Japan accounted for 58.3% of China’s rare earth metal and alloy imports, meaning six out of every ten tons of rare earths were shipped to Japan. These materials are used to manufacture motors for new energy vehicles, joints for industrial robots, and high-end sensors, supporting the global expansion of giants like Toyota and Fanuc. The U.S. is also a significant player. Although California has rare earth mines, 80% of U.S. rare earth concentrate is shipped to China for processing into magnets—akin to sending wheat to China to be milled into flour and then shipped back to bake bread. In June 2025, China’s exports of rare earth magnets to the U.S. surged by 660% to 353 tons. The immediate cause was the release of backlogged orders after a Sino-U.S. trade agreement was reached. More importantly, the "grace period" for U.S. tariffs on China was set to expire in August, prompting downstream companies to stockpile early to avoid risks. Countries like South Korea and Vietnam also accelerated imports, creating a regional buying frenzy. The Netherlands and the Taiwan region of China act more as "middlemen." The Netherlands resells 26.4% of imported rare earth compounds to European automakers, while the Taiwan region processes 16.6% of rare earths into precision electronic components, which ultimately end up in tech giants like Apple and Tesla. This "China-Middleman-End User" chain makes rare earths the "invisible lifeblood" of global supply chains. 2. Why the Sudden Surge? Policy Adjustments + Soaring Demand In April 2025, China imposed export controls on seven types of medium and heavy rare earths, including samarium and terbium, causing exports of magnets to the U.S. to plummet by 82% in April-May. Yet, just two months later, exports rebounded sharply. This turnaround was driven by three factors: First, targeted policy easing. China’s Ministry of Commerce expedited the approval process in June, prioritizing licenses for European automakers and Vietnamese processing plants while maintaining strict restrictions on U.S. military-industrial companies. For instance, German automaker Volkswagen resumed production after securing supplies of rare earth magnetic materials, while the production of U.S. F-35 fighter jets faced stagnation risks due to a shortage of samarium-cobalt magnets. This "differentiation strategy" alleviates international pressure while tightening control over critical U.S. military supplies. Second, rigid demand from the global new energy revolution. In 2025, global sales of new energy vehicles exceeded 30 million, each requiring 2-5 kg of rare earth magnets. Wind power installation capacity grew by 40% year-on-year, with each permanent magnet turbine consuming one ton of rare earth oxides. Eighty percent of China’s exported light rare earths (praseodymium, neodymium) flowed directly into these sectors. As a worker from the Bayan Obo Mine in Inner Mongolia put it, "We’re not digging dirt; we’re digging the keys to the future." Third, geopolitical stockpiling. With the U.S. tariff grace period nearing its end, companies rushed to place orders early to avoid additional tariffs of 10%-25%. Firms like South Korea’s LG Chem and Japan’s Sumitomo Electric even chartered planes to transport rare earths, fearing they would miss the "last bus." This panic buying further drove up short-term export volumes. 3. The Paradox of Rising Volume and Falling Prices: China’s Strategic Game Despite soaring export volumes, rare earth prices fell. From January to July 2025, the value of China’s rare earth exports decreased by 23.3% year-on-year, creating a paradox of "rising volume but falling prices." This reflects China’s strategic intentions: In the short term, China is ensuring global supply chain stability by easing exports of rare earths for civilian use. European automakers and Vietnamese processing plants can maintain production and avoid layoffs, indirectly reducing trade criticisms against China. Meanwhile, China continues to tightly control military-use rare earths (e.g., samarium-cobalt magnets), ensuring strategic resources are not used against its interests. In the long term, China is transitioning from "selling raw ore" to "selling technology." Companies like Northern Rare Earth are no longer content with exporting raw materials; instead, they are directly exporting value-added products like neodymium magnet powder to Europe and rare earth catalysts to Japan. In 2024, Northern Rare Earth’s profits from high-value-added exports grew by 40%, proving that "technology exports" are more profitable than "resource exports." As a government report from Baotou stated, "We will make rare earths carry Chinese technology to the world." 4. The Rare Earth War Is Far From Over: What Cards Does China Hold? Despite record export volumes, China’s control over rare earths is strengthening. Ninety percent of global rare earth refining relies on Chinese technology. Civil unrest in Myanmar reduced supplies of medium and heavy rare earths by 70%, and U.S. company MP Materials halted exports of rare earth concentrate to China, making domestic companies more reliant on local resources. More importantly, China is establishing a rare earth futures market, poised to control pricing power much like it does with oil. The 2025 rare earth export surge is essentially China’s strategic "advance by retreating" in the global supply chain. When Japanese automakers use Chinese rare earths to build motors and U.S. missiles rely on Chinese-processed magnets, the outcome of this silent war is already clear.

    Rare earths, known as "industrial vitamins" and the "mother of new materials," hold an irreplaceable strategic position in fields such as new energy, energy conservation, environmental protection, and national defense. Although there are 17 rare earth elements, the one that contributes the most to the smelting and separation industry is praseodymium-neodymium oxide (PrNd oxide), accounting for about 80%, while terbium oxide and dysprosium oxide together account for about 10%. Any rare earth smelting and separation enterprise globally relies primarily on PrNd oxide for its output value and profit.     Recently, the rare earth market has become volatile again, possibly influenced by rumors circulating online about a whitelist for rare earth enterprises and verification of total control quotas: last Friday, the price of PrNd oxide jumped by 24,000 yuan in a single day, and today it jumped again by 29,000 yuan, approaching the 600,000 yuan/ton mark. Superficially, this appears to be a sign of a hot market, but for the entire industry chain, it represents both an opportunity and hidden risks. This article attempts to offer some views on this matter; corrections are welcome for any inaccuracies.     On one hand, history has proven that excessively high prices directly suppress downstream demand. The most typical example is the wind power industry. Rare earth permanent magnet direct-drive technology was once a landmark breakthrough for domestic wind turbine manufacturers. However, as rare earth prices continued to soar, leading companies like Goldwind had to adjust their strategies, shifting towards semi-direct drive and double-fed technologies to reduce their reliance on rare earths. On the other hand, excessively high rare earth prices provide breathing room and development opportunities for the overseas rare earth industry, thereby intensifying international competition and aiding the establishment of overseas rare earth supply chains.     If we examine the rare earth industry within a longer historical context, we find that: besides the advantage of resource endowment, the true international competitive advantage of China's rare earth industry is fundamentally the cost competitiveness achieved after technological breakthroughs. This is both the root reason why we were able to defeat competitors and dominate the international market, and the key to whether we can maintain this advantage in the future.     I. Cost Advantage Established China's International Dominance in Rare Earths     The rise of China's rare earth industry actually started with "cost."     (1) The Exit of the United States: Closing its Domestic Rare Earth Industry in 2002     In the 1980s, when China's rare earth industry was just beginning, the United States was still the absolute hegemon of the global rare earth industry. At that time, the US possessed the world-class rare earth resource, the Mountain Pass mine in California, and mastered the entire industry chain from mining and separation to application, once accounting for over 65% of global rare earth supply. This situation changed completely with the development of rare earth science and technology in China. Under the leadership of esteemed figures in the rare earth field such as Academicians Xu Guangxian, Zhang Guocheng, and Yu Yongfu, China successively broke through key technologies in rare earth beneficiation and separation. These innovations were widely applied in production practice, successfully breaking the long-term monopoly held by the United States and France in rare earth smelting and separation technology. This not only significantly improved the quality of China's rare earth products but also markedly increased production efficiency. Since the 1990s, Chinese enterprises, leveraging unique resource advantages, competitive labor costs, relatively lenient environmental policies, and continuously optimized smelting and separation technologies, have continuously reduced production costs. This series of advantages made it difficult for American companies to compete, ultimately ceding dominance of the global rare earth industry. By 2002, the US finally closed the Mountain Pass mine and exited the rare earth smelting and separation segment. The decline of the US rare earth industry was not due to resource depletion but resulted from losing to China's cost advantage.     (2) The Struggles of Australia's Lynas: Near Bankruptcy in 2016     The power of China's cost advantage can also be seen in the experience of Australia's Lynas. Lynas is the largest rare earth company outside of China, but its separation plant in Malaysia has been plagued by environmental controversies and immense financial pressure. By 2016, Lynas was in severe financial crisis, burdened with debt, and even publicly sought a buyer.     However, precisely in 2017, China initiated domestic crackdowns on illegal activities, stockpiling, and verification of total control quotas in the rare earth sector, leading to strengthened supply-side control and driving the price of PrNd oxide up to 520,000 yuan/ton. This rapid price increase, in turn, gave Lynas a temporary breather, allowing it to sustain operations. Had it not been for this price surge, Lynas might have already disappeared from the global rare earth landscape. With the recent price jumps, it feels like history is repeating itself.     Facts prove that China's cost advantage is not eternal; when prices become too high, it can inadvertently support overseas competitors. Today, Lynas has become the largest overseas competitor to China's rare earth industry.     II. The "Scissors Gap" Between Rare Earth Prices and the Industry Chain     The rare earth industry is a typical "tightly coupled upstream and downstream" industrial chain. Excessively high upstream prices often lead to hindered downstream innovation and even shifts in technological routes.     Taking wind power as an example, rare earth permanent magnet direct-drive technology was dominant between 2008 and 2015, considered an important direction for improving turbine reliability and efficiency. However, if rare earth prices remain high for an extended period, turbine manufacturers are forced to turn to alternatives. Now, Goldwind has significantly increased the proportion of double-fed and semi-direct drive products, indicating that out-of-control upstream prices are forcing downstream players to abandon the rare earth permanent magnet route.     This not only affects domestic demand absorption but also influences the global market's acceptance of rare earth permanent magnets. In other words, imbalances in rare earth prices not only harm downstream enterprises but also shake the overall international competitiveness of China's rare earth industry chain.     III. International Competitive Landscape: Cost Advantage and Policy Games     (1) Gradual Development of Overseas Resources     Over the past decade, the US, Australia, Canada, Vietnam, Greenland, and others have been actively relaunching their rare earth industries. Particularly, the US-led Mountain Pass mine restarted in 2017 with plans to build a supply chain independent of China.     The advancement of these projects often relies on two aspects: firstly, rare earth prices remaining relatively high, ensuring profitability; and secondly, government subsidies and policy support. This indicates that as long as prices are high enough, the overseas rare earth industry can survive and even grow.     (2) China's Cost Advantage Still Exists but is Narrowing     Even today, China still accounts for 70-80% of global rare earth smelting and separation capacity and possesses a complete application industry chain. However, with increasing environmental requirements, rising labor costs, and more internationalized capital markets, our cost advantage is narrowing.     Meanwhile, the international market is consciously supporting non-Chinese rare earth industries. For example, the US and Australia have signed strategic cooperation agreements, and Japan and South Korea are establishing long-term supply relationships with Lynas. This trend of "de-Sinicization" of the supply chain is essentially driven by concerns that China might use rare earth prices or supply as leverage.     IV. The Key to Maintaining the Competitive Advantage of China's Rare Earth Industry     If the victory of China's rare earth industry over the past 30 years relied on "cost competitiveness," then to maintain this advantage in the future, it must "build a synergistic advantage across the entire industry chain based on cost."     (1) Adhere to Supply-Demand Balance to Prevent Excessive Price Fluctuations     Excessively high prices both suppress downstream demand and incentivize overseas competition. Industrial policies that respect market laws should be formulated to help keep market prices within a reasonable range, avoiding a repeat of the 2011 scenario where prices skyrocketed and then plummeted.     (2) Further Reduce Costs Through Technological Innovation     Past cost advantages came more from labor and environmental cost differentials. The implementation of the "Rare Earth Industrial Pollutant Discharge Standards" in 2011 spurred a large number of green environmental technologies. In recent years, industry-wide environmental standards have generally improved, and correspondingly, environmental costs have also increased. In the future, we must rely on technological progress to sustain our advantage. For example:  Improve smelting and separation efficiency, reducing energy consumption and reagent usage.  Advance green smelting, reducing environmental management costs.  Promote material conservation and recycling in application segments like magnetic materials and alloys.     (3) Strengthen Upstream-Downstream Synergy to Form a Domestic Major Cycle Advantage     The value of rare earths lies not only in mineral resources but also in final applications. If upstream and downstream form a positive interaction, for instance through long-term supply contracts, coordinated industrial fund investments, etc., it can avoid the "scissors gap" – where profit maximization at the resource end squeezes the market space of the application end – and enhance competitiveness together.     (4) Create an Internationalized Industrial Layout     Facing international "de-Sinicization," we need to proactively go global. Through investment, joint ventures, and mergers and acquisitions, participate in overseas rare earth resource development and industry chain construction, turning competitors into partners, and incorporating overseas rare earths into our global layout.     V. Conclusion: Cost Advantage is the Foundation, Synergistic Innovation is the Future     Looking back over the past 30 years, the key reason China's rare earth industry transformed from a follower to a global leader lies in the cost advantage achieved after solving key technological problems. The US exit in 2002 and Lynas's financial crisis in 2016 are clear evidence of China's cost advantage.     But today, the situation has subtly changed. Excessively high prices frustrate domestic downstream industries and also provide living space for overseas competitors. If we cannot build a synergistic advantage across the entire industry chain on the basis of cost advantage, we may become passive in future international competition.     International competition in the rare earth industry is essentially about cost, but even more so about systems. Only by ensuring cost advantage while achieving technological progress, upstream-downstream synergy, and global layout can China's rare earth industry truly seize the initiative for the future.     Written in the end: Prices are determined by supply and demand. The jump in PrNd oxide prices indicates tightening supply. Currently, for production enterprises, the worst awkward predicament is that prices have gone up, but they have no goods on hand! China possesses the world's largest proven rare earth resources and the largest global rare earth smelting and separation capacity. Why is there suddenly a supply crunch? The reasons are presumably well understood by everyone. Imagine if imported ore is also brought under the total control plan management in the future, then the market would likely lose its self-adjusting elasticity. When demand grows, prices will inevitably rise. Pursuing profit maximization is the innate nature of enterprises, the internal driving force for their survival and development. From a national strategic perspective, the value of rare earths does not lie in how high the price of rare earth products is sold for, but in how well they are used. A rough estimate of the output value of the rare earth industry chain in 2024, from mines to functional materials like rare earth permanent magnets, is about 200 billion yuan, which is less than the output value of two steel companies, Baotou Steel Group and Ansteel Group. However, the output value of end-terminal industries that indispensable rely on rare earths, such as computer, communication, and consumer electronics (3C) products, new energy vehicles, wind power generation, energy-saving elevators, industrial robots, large-scale integrated circuits, drones, etc., exceeds 20 trillion yuan. Therefore, the formulation of macro policies for the rare earth industry must focus on the synergistic effects of the industry chain, rather than the gains and losses of rare earth price fluctuations. Disclaimer:    The content described in this article represents only personal views and analysis and does not represent the position of any official institution or specific enterprise. All data and information come from public channels, and every effort has been made to ensure their accuracy and timeliness. However, due to rapid market changes and information updates, the content of this article may contain deviations. The discussion of rare earth market price fluctuations and policy suggestions in this article is intended for reference only and does not constitute investment, decision-making, or market action advice. Readers should bear their own risks when making any decisions based on the content of this article and are advised to further consult relevant professionals.     Please provide criticisms and corrections for any inappropriate points in the comments section.

According to Mining.com, a report by McKinsey & Company predicts that the market for rare earth permanent magnets will expand threefold by 2035 as the energy transition accelerates, posing greater challenges to global supply. Rare earth permanent magnets are currently the strongest magnets available for use in motors and wind turbine generators. These magnets typically require four rare earth elements as raw materials: neodymium (Nd), praseodymium (Pr), dysprosium (Dy), and terbium (Tb). The first two are the main components, while the latter two are additives used in more critical applications to enhance performance. McKinsey estimates that although they account for only 30% of total rare earth production, rare earths used in permanent magnets represent 80% of the total value of the rare earth market.   Due to its significance in clean energy technologies, global rare earths used in magnets will increase from 59,000 tons in 2022 to 176,000 tons in 2035. McKinsey adds that the main driver of this growth is the strong increase in the penetration rate of electric vehicles, which is outpacing the substitution of copper wire coil magnets for rare earths. Another factor is the rapid development of renewable energy. At the same time, supply could decrease by up to 30%. Geopolitical instability may exacerbate the shortage of rare earth supplies. McKinsey warns that although countries around the world are striving to develop their own rare earth supply chains, it will be difficult to diversify the supply chain in the next 5 to 10 years. The long lead time for building new mining and processing facilities, environmental obstacles, and high costs make secondary resources such as recycling increasingly important. Currently, over 80% of rare earth waste comes from parts in consumer electronics, electrical or internal combustion engine vehicles, all of which use smaller magnets for motors, brakes, and sensors.   However, McKinsey believes that by 2050, the increased use of magnetic rare earth elements in electric vehicles and wind turbines may lead to an expansion of waste sources. Pure electric vehicle drive systems, industrial motors, and wind turbines may generate similar amounts of waste rare earths, thereby providing a new and larger source of magnets that contain a higher proportion of valuable heavy rare earth elements. McKinsey estimates that there are approximately 40,000 tons of pre-consumer waste rare earths, which come from the design and manufacturing stages of magnets, and approximately 41,000 tons of post-consumer waste rare earths, which come from various end-of-life products. McKinsey believes that compared to the relatively concentrated distribution of pre-consumer waste rare earths, post-consumer waste rare earths are more geographically dispersed but more difficult to recycle. McKinsey states that the recycling of post-consumer rare earth elements will require the specialized separation of magnets for further processing, a practice that is not currently adopted in the existing recycling value chain, which focuses on high-value or high-volume materials such as gold and copper or aluminum and steel.

At today's (July 24th) regular press conference of the Ministry of Commerce, spokesperson He Yadong stated that all relevant departments have strengthened coordination and cooperation, maintaining a high-pressure stance of strict investigation and crackdown, and resolutely combating the smuggling and export of strategic minerals. Spokesperson He Yadong of the Ministry of Commerce: Over the past two months, all relevant departments have strengthened coordination and cooperation, showing zero tolerance and taking strong measures against the smuggling and export of strategic minerals. A number of illegal export cases have been investigated and a number of smuggling suspects have been arrested. It can be said that we have made a strong impact and formed a deterrent. During the special operation, we have also found that a few lawbreakers are attempting to evade supervision through various means, and the risk of illegal outflow of related technologies is constantly rising. The situation we face remains complex and severe. We must have the tenacity to persevere and push the special operation deeper and further. We must maintain a high-pressure stance of strict investigation and crackdown, resolutely combat the smuggling and export of strategic minerals, and safeguard national security and interests. In the next stage, the key tasks of the special operation include establishing a joint law enforcement and coordination center for dual-use items export control, promptly releasing a batch of typical law enforcement and judicial cases, and listing illegal overseas entities on the export control management list. We will formulate and issue guidelines for the compliant export of strategic minerals to guide and warn export enterprises to conduct due diligence and strictly prevent related items from being used by military users or for military purposes. (CCTV)

Since the Ministry of Commerce of China, in conjunction with the General Administration of Customs, issued the "Decision on Export Control of Certain Items of Medium and Heavy Rare Earths", the global supply chain has been shaken. China and the US have been continuously engaged in a rare earths game. The US has even attempted to use the "trade lifting of bans" on ethylene, EDA, and aircraft jet engine parts, etc., to get China to be lenient on rare earths. At the same time, to reduce its reliance on the Chinese rare earths market, the US government has begun to promote the domestic development of the rare earths industry chain, supplemented by joint development with multiple countries and regions to increase the diversity of rare earths resources supply. How do these changes affect the rare earth competition between China and the United States? How will other countries and regions respond to China's rare earth control measures? This article selects analyses from multiple authoritative think tanks to explore the current situation and development trends of the global rare earth industry.       Beyond the agreement, uncertainties remain On June 11, 2025, the Center for Strategic and International Studies in the United States released "Trump Reached Agreement to Restore Rare Earth Supply Channels". The article stated that the China-US economic and trade negotiation agreement includes China's resumption of rare earth and magnet exports to the United States. This event highlights the importance of rare earth raw materials to the US economy and China's dominant position in the global key mineral supply chain.     In April 2025, China imposed export restrictions on seven rare earth elements, directly impacting the global supply chain. This crisis exposed the high degree of dependence of Western countries on China in key mineral sectors. Although a 90-day tariff truce agreement was reached between China and the United States in May, the delay in administrative approval led to a slow recovery in actual supply. American car manufacturers were particularly affected - the Ford Chicago plant was shut down for a week, and many European automotive suppliers were forced to halt production. Japanese Suzuki even suspended the production of the Swift model. In the new framework reached in the London negotiations in June, although China committed to resuming some rare earth supplies, this was merely a temporary measure. In the long run, the US should accelerate efforts to reduce its reliance on China's heavy rare earths. Data shows that the production capacity of MP Materials in the US for neodymium iron boron magnets in 2025 is only 1,000 tons, which is less than 1% of China's production in 2018. This highlights that the process of achieving supply chain autonomy is arduous. The US strategy for breaking through focuses on two directions: One is to achieve diversification of the rare earth supply chain through Australia. The country's production of rare earth oxides is planned to triple within three years. After the Arafura Rare Earths Limited starts production next year, it is expected to account for 4% of the global demand for neodymium and praseodymium by 2032. The other is that in its "Defense Industry Strategy", the US states that it aims to establish a "mine-magnet" full industrial chain by 2027.       The supply and demand dynamics in the rare earth market are intertwined with geopolitics. On May 31, 2025, the International Energy Agency released the latest "2025 Global Critical Minerals Outlook". The report indicates that in 2024, the global demand for major energy minerals saw a strong growth. The continuous expansion of battery power and new energy infrastructure led to a nearly 30% increase in lithium demand, while nickel, cobalt, graphite and rare earths maintained a high growth rate of 6% to 8%.     The report indicates that the potential shortage of copper and lithium is the most decisive. Although the overall supply of energy minerals seems abundant in the short term, both copper and lithium will face severe shortages in the medium and long term: by 2035, the primary copper shortage may reach 30%, and the lithium shortage may also approach 40%. Once the shortages materialize, it will increase the cost of downstream products, forcing new energy and industrial projects to postpone or reduce their scale, thereby slowing down the global process of achieving net zero goals. The report states that strategic mineral resources that underpin the new energy and high-tech industries are facing multiple market risks. Firstly, due to the small scale of the market and limited transparency, the key mineral markets are prone to price fluctuations. According to statistics, among the 20 strategic minerals, 75% have a higher price volatility rate than crude oil, and half exceed that of natural gas. Secondly, trade restrictions affect the key mineral markets. A series of recent export control policies have increased market uncertainty. Moreover, the highly concentrated supply (especially in the refining and processing stages) amplifies the risks: China dominates the refining capacity of 19 out of the 20 strategic minerals, accounting for an average market share of approximately 70%. Additionally, minerals such as tantalum, titanium, and vanadium either lack feasible alternatives or require a compromise between cost and performance. The report also mentions that although technological innovation (such as AI exploration, DLE, and tailings reutilization) can enhance efficiency, it is difficult to mitigate geopolitical risks; likewise, policy support (tax incentives, price differentials, long-term purchase and sale agreements) will not form a sustained driving force without the availability of practical technologies. Therefore, "technology and policy" collaboration is necessary to break the reliance on a single approach. By providing loan guarantees, strategic reserves, and simplified approval processes from the government and international organizations, and by providing targeted support for efficient technology projects, it is possible to both introduce new production entities and ensure that these entities operate stably under both policy and market safeguards.       The United States currently lacks a suitable alternative supply chain. The Center for Strategic and International Studies of the United States released "The Consequences of China's New Restrictions on Rare Earth Exports" on April 14th, stating that China's practice of restricting the export of seven types of rare earth elements has caused a huge stir in the international market, especially in the relevant industries of the United States. The US defense technology sector was the first to be impacted. From the perspective of procurement, the restrictions have brought about threefold effects. Firstly, during the establishment of the licensing system, export activities were temporarily suspended, disrupting the stable procurement rhythm of US enterprises. Secondly, 16 US defense and aerospace enterprises were included in the export control list, significantly increasing the risk of supply chain disruption. Thirdly, the dynamic licensing system has prompted countries to seek cooperation with China. If US enterprises fail to adapt in time, they may lose their advantages in international competition.     The United States is also extremely vulnerable in the supply chain of rare earths. China has long held 99% of the global market share for processing rare earths. The only Vietnamese refinery that can provide a small amount of output has been out of production for a year due to tax disputes. This makes the United States highly dependent on China for rare earth supply. This restriction on heavy rare earths directly targets the core of the US supply chain. Currently, the United States does not have the ability to separate rare earths. By the end of 2025, MP Materials, funded by the Pentagon, can only produce 1,000 tons of NdFeB magnets annually, while China was already able to produce 138,000 tons of NdFeB magnets annually in 2018; in 2024, MP Materials announced an output of 1300 tons of oxide NdPr, and China produced approximately 300,000 tons of NdFeB magnets in 2018. Although the United States has relevant development plans, they are far from the target. Although the Department of Defense has invested over 439 million US dollars (approximately 3.18 billion yuan) to build the domestic supply chain, the related facilities will not be able to meet the defense needs until 2027. Rare earth elements are of great significance to the national security of the United States. In defense technologies, numerous key equipment such as the F-35 fighter jet, Virginia-class and Columbia-class submarines, and "Tomahawk" missiles all extensively utilize rare earth elements. An F-35 fighter jet contains over 900 pounds of rare earth, and a Virginia-class submarine requires approximately 9,200 pounds. The United States already has a disadvantage in the manufacturing of defense technologies, and if China restricts the import of key minerals, it will rapidly widen the military capability gap between China and the United States. When it comes to seeking alternative suppliers for international cooperation, although many countries have plans and investments for developing rare earth resources, currently China still holds a dominant position in the heavy rare earth refining process. Although Australia has been striving to develop the Browns Range mine to make it a production base for dysprosium, it still needs a lot of work in terms of processing and refining capacity construction, and will still rely on China's oxide refining technology at least until 2026. The article points out that the United States needs to strengthen cooperation with other countries and accelerate the overcoming of the technical knowledge gap in rare earth separation and processing.     Africa may become the next main battlefield for competition between China and the US The report "How China and the US Invest in Key Minerals" released by the Stimson Center points out that in the current situation where global demand for key minerals is surging and geopolitical situations are complex and volatile, the competition between China and the US in the field of key minerals in Africa has become increasingly prominent. From the perspective of investment scale, in 2023, through the "Belt and Road Initiative", China's total economic participation in Africa reached 21.7 billion US dollars (approximately 155.689 billion yuan), among which the investment in key mineral projects was approximately 8 to 10 billion US dollars; while the United States invested 7.4 billion US dollars (approximately 53.025 billion yuan) in Africa that year, with key mineral investment being only about 300 million US dollars. China's investment in key minerals in Africa was far greater than that of the United States.     The goal of the green energy transition has driven China's demand for key minerals. As a signatory to the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals, China has vigorously developed clean technologies, resulting in a significant increase in demand for key minerals. Policies such as the "New Energy Vehicle Industry Development Plan (2021-2035)" and the "New Three Goods" economic growth drivers have prompted enterprises to strengthen the supply chain of key minerals. Africa has become an important supply source. For instance, nearly 90% of China's cobalt is imported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The United States, aiming to reduce its reliance on key minerals from China and ensure national security, urgently needs to diversify the supply chain of key minerals. Africa has become an important partner for it. In terms of investment projects, China has made extensive deployments in key mineral industries in Africa. In 2023, copper-related projects in the Democratic Republic of the Congo were valued at over 2 billion US dollars (approximately 143.31 billion yuan), in Botswana it was nearly 2 billion US dollars, and there were also large-scale projects such as lithium mining in Mali and Zimbabwe. At the same time, China is a global center for the import, refining, and processing of key minerals. It accounts for 85-90% of global rare earth element refining and processing. In terms of key mineral exports in Africa, China is the largest importer of many minerals, such as 72% of cobalt and 28% of graphite. The two sides have formed a mutually dependent relationship. The United States, through institutions such as the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), has invested in multiple projects in Africa to strengthen key mineral supply chains. For instance, it invested in the "Lobito Railway Corridor Project". It also signed memorandums of understanding with countries like Angola and Zambia. When providing funds, DFC emphasizes cooperation with the private sector and highlights environmental, social, and governance (ESG) standards. This contrasts with the model used by China, where state-owned enterprises play a leading role, investment is driven by the state, and it often faces criticism due to ESG compliance issues. Looking ahead, the new Trump administration's stance on the critical mineral supply chain in Africa remains unclear. Although they have the intention to obtain critical minerals, such as proposing cooperation with Greenland and discussing the acquisition of minerals with Ukraine, there is still uncertainty regarding whether they will continue the measures of the Biden administration in their diplomatic and economic engagement with Africa. China is expected to continue to expand its participation in the critical mineral sector in Africa. The role of Africa in the US's critical mineral supply chain is full of uncertainties, and the competitive situation between China and the US in the critical mineral sector in Africa will continue and may evolve.     Europe: An Important Variable in the Competition for Rare Earths between China and the US? On April 17, 2025, the China-Europe Policy Analysis Center released the report "Rare Earth Minerals: China + Tariffs = Crisis". The article states that recently, China suspended the export of six types of rare earth minerals, posing a severe challenge to Western industries. Between relying on Chinese supply and seeking solutions independently, the West is at a crucial crossroads.       In response to the scarcity situation caused by China's restrictions on rare earth exports, Europe has focused on developing new technologies and production capacity for recycling. The "Critical Raw Materials Act" was thus born, setting targets for domestic mining, processing and recycling, and reducing reliance on a single supplier. The European Commission has launched 47 strategic projects in 13 member states to promote the all-round development of key minerals. In practice, a number of enterprises and projects dedicated to rare earth recycling have emerged across Europe. Heraeus Remloy in Germany has built the largest rare earth magnet recycling plant in Europe, aiming to significantly increase production capacity to meet over 30% of the new magnet demand in Europe; Carmag in France has constructed a large-scale recycling facility, with the goal of recycling a large amount of rare earths and producing considerable amounts of heavy rare earth oxides annually; Ionic Technologies in the UK has developed a patented process to recover key elements from decommissioned equipment; Hydrometal in Belgium utilizes its expertise to recycle rare earth elements subject to export restrictions from China; NeoPerformanceMaterials in Estonia and RarEarth in Italy focus on the recycling of electric motors. These efforts aim to build a comprehensive circular economy strategy, reduce reliance on imports, and enhance the resilience of Europe in the field of rare earths. In summary, China will continue to dominate global rare earth supply in the short term. However, in the medium and long term, it will also face multiple challenges: On one hand, as other countries accelerate production and technological breakthroughs, and as the international community's ability to replace and recycle strategic minerals continuously improves, China's market share may be squeezed; on the other hand, export control countermeasures and geopolitical frictions may also increase industry uncertainty. China not only needs to accelerate the improvement of its long-term resource development and technological innovation layout, but also should strengthen the supervision and crackdown on rare earth smuggling, improve the transparency of the industrial chain, in order to ensure supply chain security and consolidate its industry leadership position.